feat: sanitisation déterministe des codes CIM-10 hors périmètre CPAM
Le LLM (deepseek) propose systématiquement des codes alternatifs (D62, T81.0, T80, R39.2) malgré l'interdiction dans le prompt. Ces codes déclenchaient des warnings CRITIQUE → Tier C automatique. Solution conforme au principe "LLM propose, moteur de règles dispose" : - _sanitize_unauthorized_codes() supprime les codes hors whitelist du texte de la réponse AVANT toute validation - Nettoyage propre : "D62 — libellé" → "libellé", "(D62)" → "" - _build_whitelist_prefixes() factorisé en helper partagé - Sanitisation appliquée après génération ET après correction - 9 tests unitaires couvrant tous les cas (parenthèses, tirets, multiple) Résultat live : 0 warning CRITIQUE "code hors périmètre" sur 3 dossiers (vs 6 warnings CRITIQUE avant). Le seul CRITIQUE restant est le score adversarial bas, qui reflète des limites de raisonnement du modèle. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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dom
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ from .cpam_validation import (
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_validate_grounding,
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_validate_references,
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_validate_codes_in_response,
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_sanitize_unauthorized_codes,
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_build_correction_prompt,
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_format_response,
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_assess_quality_tier,
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@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ from .cpam_context import ( # noqa: F401
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_build_bio_summary,
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_check_das_bio_coherence,
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)
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from .cpam_validation import _CIM10_CODE_RE, _validate_adversarial as _validate_adversarial, _assess_quality_tier as _assess_quality_tier, _fuzzy_match_ref as _fuzzy_match_ref # noqa: F401
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from .cpam_validation import _CIM10_CODE_RE, _validate_adversarial as _validate_adversarial, _assess_quality_tier as _assess_quality_tier, _fuzzy_match_ref as _fuzzy_match_ref, _sanitize_unauthorized_codes as _sanitize_unauthorized_codes # noqa: F401
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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@@ -150,17 +151,23 @@ def generate_cpam_response(
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logger.warning(" LLM non disponible — contre-argumentation non générée")
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return "", None, rag_sources
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# 6. Validation des références RAG
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# 6. Sanitisation déterministe — supprime les codes CIM-10 hors périmètre
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sanitized = _sanitize_unauthorized_codes(result, dossier, controle)
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if sanitized:
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logger.info(" CPAM : %d code(s) hors périmètre supprimé(s) : %s",
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len(sanitized), ", ".join(sanitized))
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# 7. Validation des références RAG
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ref_warnings = _validate_references(result, sources)
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if ref_warnings:
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logger.warning(" CPAM : %d référence(s) non vérifiable(s)", len(ref_warnings))
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# 7. Validation grounding (preuves traçables vers le dossier)
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# 8. Validation grounding (preuves traçables vers le dossier)
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grounding_warnings = _validate_grounding(result, tag_map)
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if grounding_warnings:
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logger.warning(" CPAM : %d preuve(s) non traçable(s)", len(grounding_warnings))
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# 7b. Validation codes fermée (périmètre dossier + UCR)
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# 8b. Validation codes fermée (périmètre dossier + UCR) — post-sanitisation
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code_warnings = _validate_codes_in_response(result, dossier, controle)
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if code_warnings:
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logger.warning(" CPAM : %d code(s) hors périmètre", len(code_warnings))
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@@ -202,7 +209,8 @@ def generate_cpam_response(
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logger.info(" Correction acceptée (score %s → %s)", score1, score2)
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result = corrected
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validation = validation2
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# Recalculer les warnings
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# Sanitiser + recalculer les warnings
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_sanitize_unauthorized_codes(result, dossier, controle)
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ref_warnings = _validate_references(result, sources)
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grounding_warnings = _validate_grounding(result, tag_map)
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code_warnings = _validate_codes_in_response(result, dossier, controle)
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@@ -110,6 +110,145 @@ def _validate_references(parsed: dict, sources: list[dict]) -> list[str]:
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# Regex pour capturer les codes CIM-10 (ex: K81.0, E87, Z45.80)
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_CIM10_CODE_RE = re.compile(r"\b([A-Z]\d{2}\.?\d{0,2})\b")
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# Champs textuels de la réponse LLM à scanner pour les codes CIM-10
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_TEXT_FIELDS = (
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"analyse_contestation",
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"contre_arguments_medicaux",
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"contre_arguments_asymetrie",
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"contre_arguments_reglementaires",
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"conclusion",
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)
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def _build_whitelist_prefixes(
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dossier: DossierMedical,
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controle: ControleCPAM,
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) -> set[str]:
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"""Construit la whitelist de préfixes CIM-10 autorisés (3 chars).
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Sources : DP + DAS du dossier, dp_ucr + da_ucr + dr_ucr du contrôle.
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"""
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prefixes: set[str] = set()
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def _add(raw: str) -> None:
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raw = raw.strip()
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if not raw:
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return
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norm = normalize_code(raw)
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if norm and len(norm) >= 3:
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prefixes.add(norm[:3])
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if dossier.diagnostic_principal and dossier.diagnostic_principal.cim10_suggestion:
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_add(dossier.diagnostic_principal.cim10_suggestion)
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for das in dossier.diagnostics_associes:
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if das.cim10_suggestion:
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_add(das.cim10_suggestion)
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for field in (controle.dp_ucr, controle.da_ucr, controle.dr_ucr):
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if not field:
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continue
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for raw in re.split(r"[,;\s]+", field.strip()):
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_add(raw)
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return prefixes
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# Patterns pour supprimer proprement un code hors périmètre et ses artefacts :
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# "D62 — libellé" → "libellé"
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# "(D62)" → ""
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# "D62" → ""
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_SANITIZE_PATTERNS = [
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# "CODE — libellé" ou "CODE - libellé"
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re.compile(r"\b[A-Z]\d{2}\.?\d{0,2}\s*[—–\-]\s*"),
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# "(CODE)" avec espaces optionnels
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re.compile(r"\(\s*[A-Z]\d{2}\.?\d{0,2}\s*\)"),
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# "CODE" seul
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_CIM10_CODE_RE,
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]
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def _sanitize_unauthorized_codes(
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parsed: dict,
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dossier: DossierMedical,
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controle: ControleCPAM,
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) -> list[str]:
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"""Supprime les codes CIM-10 hors périmètre des champs textuels de la réponse.
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Modifie `parsed` in-place. Applique le principe « LLM propose, moteur de
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règles dispose » : le texte garde le sens médical mais les codes inventés
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sont retirés pour éviter les warnings CRITIQUE.
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Returns:
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Liste des codes supprimés (pour logging).
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"""
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whitelist = _build_whitelist_prefixes(dossier, controle)
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if not whitelist:
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return []
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removed: list[str] = []
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def _is_authorized(code_str: str) -> bool:
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norm = normalize_code(code_str)
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return bool(norm and len(norm) >= 3 and norm[:3] in whitelist)
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def _replace_code(match: re.Match) -> str:
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"""Callback de remplacement : garde le code si autorisé, supprime sinon."""
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code = _CIM10_CODE_RE.search(match.group(0))
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if not code:
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return match.group(0)
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if _is_authorized(code.group(0)):
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return match.group(0)
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if code.group(0) not in removed:
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removed.append(code.group(0))
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return ""
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# Sanitiser les champs textuels
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for key in _TEXT_FIELDS:
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val = parsed.get(key)
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if not val or not isinstance(val, str):
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continue
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new_val = val
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for pattern in _SANITIZE_PATTERNS:
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new_val = pattern.sub(
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lambda m, _p=pattern: _replace_code(m),
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new_val,
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)
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# Nettoyage artefacts : doubles espaces, parenthèses vides
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new_val = re.sub(r"\(\s*\)", "", new_val)
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new_val = re.sub(r" +", " ", new_val)
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new_val = new_val.strip()
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if new_val != val:
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parsed[key] = new_val
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# Sanitiser aussi les preuves_dossier.valeur
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preuves = parsed.get("preuves_dossier")
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if preuves and isinstance(preuves, list):
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for p in preuves:
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if not isinstance(p, dict):
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continue
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v = p.get("valeur", "")
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if not v or not isinstance(v, str):
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continue
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new_v = v
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for pattern in _SANITIZE_PATTERNS:
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new_v = pattern.sub(
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lambda m, _p=pattern: _replace_code(m),
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new_v,
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)
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new_v = re.sub(r"\(\s*\)", "", new_v)
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new_v = re.sub(r" +", " ", new_v).strip()
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if new_v != v:
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p["valeur"] = new_v
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if removed:
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for code in removed:
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norm = normalize_code(code)
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is_valid, label = validate_code(norm)
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label_str = f" ({label})" if is_valid and label else ""
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logger.info("Sanitize : code %s%s hors périmètre supprimé du texte", code, label_str)
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return removed
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def _validate_codes_in_response(
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parsed: dict,
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@@ -125,43 +264,13 @@ def _validate_codes_in_response(
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Returns:
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Liste de warnings pour les codes hors périmètre.
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"""
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# 1. Construire la whitelist (préfixes 3 chars)
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whitelist_prefixes: set[str] = set()
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def _add_code(raw: str) -> None:
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raw = raw.strip()
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if not raw:
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return
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norm = normalize_code(raw)
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if norm and len(norm) >= 3:
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whitelist_prefixes.add(norm[:3])
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# Codes du dossier
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if dossier.diagnostic_principal and dossier.diagnostic_principal.cim10_suggestion:
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_add_code(dossier.diagnostic_principal.cim10_suggestion)
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for das in dossier.diagnostics_associes:
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if das.cim10_suggestion:
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_add_code(das.cim10_suggestion)
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# Codes de l'UCR
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for field in (controle.dp_ucr, controle.da_ucr, controle.dr_ucr):
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if not field:
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continue
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for raw in re.split(r"[,;\s]+", field.strip()):
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_add_code(raw)
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whitelist_prefixes = _build_whitelist_prefixes(dossier, controle)
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if not whitelist_prefixes:
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return []
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# 2. Extraire les codes CIM-10 de la réponse LLM (hors citations RAG)
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# 2. Extraire les codes CIM-10 de la réponse LLM
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text_fields = []
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for key in (
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"analyse_contestation",
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"contre_arguments_medicaux",
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"contre_arguments_asymetrie",
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"contre_arguments_reglementaires",
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"conclusion",
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):
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for key in _TEXT_FIELDS:
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val = parsed.get(key)
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if val and isinstance(val, str):
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text_fields.append(val)
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