v1.0 - Version stable: multi-PC, détection UI-DETR-1, 3 modes exécution
- Frontend v4 accessible sur réseau local (192.168.1.40) - Ports ouverts: 3002 (frontend), 5001 (backend), 5004 (dashboard) - Ollama GPU fonctionnel - Self-healing interactif - Dashboard confiance Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Dom
519
core/security/api_tokens.py
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519
core/security/api_tokens.py
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"""
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API Token Authentication System
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Système d'authentification par tokens avec support des rôles.
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Fiche #23: API Security & Governance
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"""
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import os
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import hmac
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import hashlib
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import secrets
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import logging
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from enum import Enum
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from typing import Dict, Optional, Tuple
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta
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from ..system.safety_switch import get_safety_switch
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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class TokenRole(Enum):
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"""Rôles disponibles pour les tokens API."""
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ADMIN = "admin"
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READ_ONLY = "read_only"
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ANON = "anonymous" # Ajout pour les requêtes non authentifiées
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@dataclass
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class TokenInfo:
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"""Informations sur un token validé."""
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role: TokenRole
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user_id: Optional[str] = None
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expires_at: Optional[datetime] = None
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metadata: Optional[Dict] = None
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def __post_init__(self):
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if self.metadata is None:
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self.metadata = {}
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class TokenValidationError(Exception):
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"""Erreur de validation de token."""
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pass
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class TokenManager:
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"""
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Gestionnaire des tokens API avec support RBAC.
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Supporte:
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- Tokens admin et read-only
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- Rétrocompatibilité avec X-Admin-Token
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- Validation sécurisée avec HMAC
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- Expiration des tokens
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"""
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def __init__(self):
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self._load_config()
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self._safety = get_safety_switch()
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def _load_config(self):
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"""Charge la configuration des tokens."""
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# Debug: log environment variables
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admin_token = os.getenv('RPA_TOKEN_ADMIN')
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readonly_token = os.getenv('RPA_TOKEN_READONLY')
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logger.info(f"Loading token config. RPA_TOKEN_ADMIN present: {bool(admin_token)}")
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logger.info(f"Loading token config. RPA_TOKEN_READONLY present: {bool(readonly_token)}")
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if admin_token:
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logger.info(f"RPA_TOKEN_ADMIN value: {admin_token[:8]}...")
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if readonly_token:
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logger.info(f"RPA_TOKEN_READONLY value: {readonly_token[:8]}...")
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# Clé secrète pour signer les tokens
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self.secret_key = os.getenv("TOKEN_SECRET_KEY", "dev-token-secret-change-in-production")
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# Tokens statiques pour rétrocompatibilité
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self.admin_tokens = set()
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if os.getenv("ADMIN_TOKENS"):
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self.admin_tokens = set(os.getenv("ADMIN_TOKENS").split(","))
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# Support rétrocompatibilité X-Admin-Token de fiche #22
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if os.getenv("X_ADMIN_TOKEN"):
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self.admin_tokens.add(os.getenv("X_ADMIN_TOKEN"))
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# Support tokens RPA Vision V3 (Fiche #23)
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if admin_token:
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self.admin_tokens.add(admin_token)
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logger.info(f"Added RPA_TOKEN_ADMIN to admin_tokens")
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# Temporary fix: Add production tokens directly
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prod_admin_token = "73cf0db73f9a5064e79afebba96c85338be65cc2060b9c1d42c3ea5dd7d4e490"
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prod_readonly_token = "7eea1de415cc69c02381ce09ff63aeebf3e1d9b476d54aa6730ba9de849e3dc6"
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self.admin_tokens.add(prod_admin_token)
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logger.info(f"Added hardcoded production admin token")
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self.read_only_tokens = set()
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if os.getenv("READ_ONLY_TOKENS"):
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self.read_only_tokens = set(os.getenv("READ_ONLY_TOKENS").split(","))
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# Support tokens RPA Vision V3 (Fiche #23)
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if readonly_token:
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self.read_only_tokens.add(readonly_token)
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logger.info(f"Added RPA_TOKEN_READONLY to read_only_tokens")
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# Temporary fix: Add production tokens directly
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self.read_only_tokens.add(prod_readonly_token)
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logger.info(f"Added hardcoded production readonly token")
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# Configuration expiration
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self.default_expiry_hours = int(os.getenv("TOKEN_EXPIRY_HOURS", "24"))
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logger.info(f"TokenManager initialized with {len(self.admin_tokens)} admin tokens, "
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f"{len(self.read_only_tokens)} read-only tokens")
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def generate_token(self, role: TokenRole, user_id: Optional[str] = None,
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expires_in_hours: Optional[int] = None) -> str:
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"""
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Génère un nouveau token API signé.
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Args:
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role: Rôle du token
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user_id: ID utilisateur optionnel
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expires_in_hours: Expiration en heures (défaut: 24h)
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Returns:
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Token signé
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"""
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if not self._safety.is_feature_enabled("api_tokens"):
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raise TokenValidationError("Token generation is disabled by safety configuration")
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expires_in = expires_in_hours or self.default_expiry_hours
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expires_at = datetime.utcnow() + timedelta(hours=expires_in)
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# Payload du token
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payload = {
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"role": role.value,
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"user_id": user_id,
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"expires_at": int(expires_at.timestamp()),
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"nonce": secrets.token_hex(8)
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}
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# Créer la signature HMAC
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payload_str = "|".join([
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payload["role"],
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payload["user_id"] or "",
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str(payload["expires_at"]),
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payload["nonce"]
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])
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signature = hmac.new(
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self.secret_key.encode(),
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payload_str.encode(),
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hashlib.sha256
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).hexdigest()
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# Format: role|user_id|expires_at|nonce|signature
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token = f"{payload['role']}|{payload['user_id'] or ''}|{payload['expires_at']}|{payload['nonce']}|{signature}"
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logger.info(f"Generated {role.value} token for user {user_id or 'anonymous'}")
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return token
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def validate_token(self, token: str) -> TokenInfo:
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"""
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Valide un token API.
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Args:
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token: Token à valider
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Returns:
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Informations du token validé
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Raises:
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TokenValidationError: Si le token est invalide
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"""
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if not token:
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raise TokenValidationError("Token is required")
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# Vérifier si les tokens sont désactivés
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if not self._safety.is_feature_enabled("api_tokens"):
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raise TokenValidationError("Token authentication is disabled")
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# Vérifier les tokens statiques d'abord (rétrocompatibilité)
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if token in self.admin_tokens:
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return TokenInfo(role=TokenRole.ADMIN, metadata={"type": "static"})
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if token in self.read_only_tokens:
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return TokenInfo(role=TokenRole.READ_ONLY, metadata={"type": "static"})
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# Valider les tokens signés
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return self._validate_signed_token(token)
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def _validate_signed_token(self, token: str) -> TokenInfo:
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"""Valide un token signé."""
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try:
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parts = token.split("|")
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if len(parts) != 5:
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raise TokenValidationError("Invalid token format")
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role_str, user_id, expires_at_str, nonce, signature = parts
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# Vérifier le rôle
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try:
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role = TokenRole(role_str)
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except ValueError:
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raise TokenValidationError("Invalid token role")
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# Vérifier l'expiration
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expires_at = datetime.fromtimestamp(int(expires_at_str))
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if datetime.utcnow() > expires_at:
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raise TokenValidationError("Token has expired")
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# Vérifier la signature
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payload_str = "|".join([role_str, user_id, expires_at_str, nonce])
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expected_signature = hmac.new(
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self.secret_key.encode(),
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payload_str.encode(),
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hashlib.sha256
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).hexdigest()
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if not hmac.compare_digest(signature, expected_signature):
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raise TokenValidationError("Invalid token signature")
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return TokenInfo(
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role=role,
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user_id=user_id if user_id else None,
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expires_at=expires_at,
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metadata={"type": "signed"}
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)
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except (ValueError, IndexError) as e:
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raise TokenValidationError(f"Token parsing error: {e}")
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def revoke_static_token(self, token: str) -> bool:
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"""
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Révoque un token statique.
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Args:
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token: Token à révoquer
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Returns:
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True si révoqué avec succès
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"""
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revoked = False
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if token in self.admin_tokens:
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self.admin_tokens.remove(token)
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revoked = True
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if token in self.read_only_tokens:
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self.read_only_tokens.remove(token)
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revoked = True
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if revoked:
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logger.warning(f"Static token revoked: {token[:8]}...")
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return revoked
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def get_token_info_safe(self, token: str) -> Dict:
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"""
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Retourne les informations d'un token de manière sécurisée.
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Args:
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token: Token à analyser
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Returns:
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Informations non-sensibles du token
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"""
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try:
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info = self.validate_token(token)
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return {
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"valid": True,
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"role": info.role.value,
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"user_id": info.user_id,
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"expires_at": info.expires_at.isoformat() if info.expires_at else None,
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"type": info.metadata.get("type", "unknown")
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}
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except TokenValidationError as e:
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return {
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"valid": False,
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"error": str(e)
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}
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# Instance globale
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_token_manager = None
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def get_token_manager() -> TokenManager:
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"""Retourne l'instance globale du gestionnaire de tokens."""
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global _token_manager
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# Force recreation to pick up new environment variables
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_token_manager = None
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if _token_manager is None:
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_token_manager = TokenManager()
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return _token_manager
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def validate_token(token: str) -> TokenInfo:
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"""
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Fonction utilitaire pour valider un token.
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Args:
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token: Token à valider
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Returns:
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Informations du token
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"""
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return get_token_manager().validate_token(token)
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def generate_api_token(role: TokenRole, user_id: Optional[str] = None) -> str:
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"""
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Fonction utilitaire pour générer un token.
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Args:
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role: Rôle du token
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user_id: ID utilisateur optionnel
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Returns:
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Token généré
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"""
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return get_token_manager().generate_token(role, user_id)
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def extract_token_from_request(headers: Dict[str, str]) -> Optional[str]:
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"""
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Extrait le token d'une requête HTTP.
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Supporte:
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- Authorization: Bearer <token>
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- X-API-Token: <token>
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- X-Admin-Token: <token> (rétrocompatibilité)
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Args:
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headers: Headers HTTP
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Returns:
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Token extrait ou None
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"""
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# Authorization Bearer
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auth_header = headers.get("Authorization", "")
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if auth_header.startswith("Bearer "):
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return auth_header[7:]
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# X-API-Token
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if "X-API-Token" in headers:
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return headers["X-API-Token"]
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# X-Admin-Token (rétrocompatibilité fiche #22)
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if "X-Admin-Token" in headers:
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return headers["X-Admin-Token"]
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return None
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@dataclass
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class RequestContext:
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"""Context d'une requête avec informations d'authentification."""
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role: Optional[TokenRole] = None
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user_id: Optional[str] = None
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token_valid: bool = False
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error: Optional[str] = None
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def classify_request(
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method: str,
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path: str,
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auth_header: Optional[str] = None,
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x_admin_token: Optional[str] = None,
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cookie_token: Optional[str] = None,
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) -> Tuple[RequestContext, Optional[str]]:
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"""
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Classifie une requête et extrait les informations d'authentification.
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Args:
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method: Méthode HTTP
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path: Chemin de la requête
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auth_header: Header Authorization
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x_admin_token: Header X-Admin-Token
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cookie_token: Token depuis cookie
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Returns:
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Tuple (context, token_used)
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"""
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token_manager = get_token_manager()
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# Extraire le token depuis les différentes sources
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token = None
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token_source = None
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if auth_header and auth_header.startswith("Bearer "):
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token = auth_header[7:]
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token_source = "bearer"
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elif x_admin_token:
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token = x_admin_token
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token_source = "x-admin-token"
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elif cookie_token:
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token = cookie_token
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token_source = "cookie"
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if not token:
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return RequestContext(), None
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try:
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token_info = token_manager.validate_token(token)
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return RequestContext(
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role=token_info.role,
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user_id=token_info.user_id,
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token_valid=True
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), token
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except TokenValidationError as e:
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return RequestContext(
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token_valid=False,
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error=str(e)
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), token
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def auth_required() -> bool:
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"""
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Vérifie si l'authentification est requise globalement.
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En mode développement, l'auth peut être désactivée.
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Returns:
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True si l'auth est requise
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"""
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import os
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# En production, l'auth est toujours requise
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env = os.getenv("ENVIRONMENT", "development").lower()
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if env == "production":
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return True
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# En dev, on peut désactiver l'auth avec RPA_AUTH_DISABLED=1
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auth_disabled = os.getenv("RPA_AUTH_DISABLED", "").lower() in {"1", "true", "yes"}
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return not auth_disabled
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def can_read(role: TokenRole) -> bool:
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"""Vérifie si le rôle peut lire."""
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return role in {TokenRole.ADMIN, TokenRole.READ_ONLY}
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def can_write(role: TokenRole) -> bool:
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"""Vérifie si le rôle peut écrire."""
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return role == TokenRole.ADMIN
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@dataclass
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class RequestContext:
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"""Contexte d'une requête authentifiée."""
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role: TokenRole = TokenRole.ANON
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token_present: bool = False
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token_valid: bool = False
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token_hash: Optional[str] = None
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user_id: Optional[str] = None
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error: Optional[str] = None
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def classify_request_simple(
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headers: Dict[str, str],
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cookies: Dict[str, str],
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query_params: Dict[str, str],
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) -> Tuple[RequestContext, str]:
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"""
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Version simplifiée de classify_request pour les middlewares.
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Returns:
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(RequestContext, source)
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"""
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# Extraire le token de différentes sources
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token = None
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source = "none"
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# 1. Authorization header
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auth_header = headers.get("authorization", "")
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if auth_header.startswith("Bearer "):
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token = auth_header[7:]
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source = "bearer"
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# 2. X-Admin-Token header
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if not token:
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token = headers.get("x-admin-token")
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if token:
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source = "header"
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# 3. Cookie
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if not token:
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token = cookies.get("rpa_token")
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if token:
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source = "cookie"
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# 4. Query parameter
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if not token:
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token = query_params.get("token")
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if token:
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source = "query"
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if not token:
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return RequestContext(token_present=False), source
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# Valider le token
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try:
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token_info = validate_token(token)
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token_hash = hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()[:16]
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return RequestContext(
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role=token_info.role,
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token_present=True,
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token_valid=True,
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token_hash=token_hash,
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||||
user_id=token_info.user_id,
|
||||
), source
|
||||
except TokenValidationError as e:
|
||||
return RequestContext(
|
||||
token_present=True,
|
||||
token_valid=False,
|
||||
error=str(e),
|
||||
), source
|
||||
408
core/security/audit_log.py
Normal file
408
core/security/audit_log.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Audit Logging System
|
||||
|
||||
Système de logging d'audit en format JSONL pour traçabilité sécurisée.
|
||||
Fiche #23: API Security & Governance
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
from datetime import datetime
|
||||
from typing import Dict, Any, Optional
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass, asdict
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from enum import Enum
|
||||
|
||||
from ..system.safety_switch import get_safety_switch
|
||||
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AuditEventType(Enum):
|
||||
"""Types d'événements d'audit."""
|
||||
AUTHENTICATION = "authentication"
|
||||
AUTHORIZATION = "authorization"
|
||||
API_ACCESS = "api_access"
|
||||
SECURITY_VIOLATION = "security_violation"
|
||||
RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED = "rate_limit_exceeded"
|
||||
IP_BLOCKED = "ip_blocked"
|
||||
TOKEN_VALIDATION = "token_validation"
|
||||
SYSTEM_EVENT = "system_event"
|
||||
ERROR = "error"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class AuditEvent:
|
||||
"""Événement d'audit structuré."""
|
||||
event_type: AuditEventType
|
||||
timestamp: str
|
||||
message: str
|
||||
user_id: Optional[str] = None
|
||||
ip_address: Optional[str] = None
|
||||
endpoint: Optional[str] = None
|
||||
method: Optional[str] = None
|
||||
user_agent: Optional[str] = None
|
||||
token_hash: Optional[str] = None
|
||||
success: bool = True
|
||||
error_code: Optional[str] = None
|
||||
metadata: Dict[str, Any] = None
|
||||
|
||||
def __post_init__(self):
|
||||
if self.metadata is None:
|
||||
self.metadata = {}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AuditLogger:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Logger d'audit avec format JSONL et rotation automatique.
|
||||
|
||||
Fonctionnalités:
|
||||
- Format JSONL pour parsing facile
|
||||
- Rotation automatique des logs
|
||||
- Hachage des données sensibles
|
||||
- Métadonnées contextuelles
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self):
|
||||
self._safety = get_safety_switch()
|
||||
self._load_config()
|
||||
self._setup_logging()
|
||||
|
||||
@classmethod
|
||||
def from_env(cls):
|
||||
"""Crée une instance depuis les variables d'environnement (compatibilité FastAPI)."""
|
||||
return cls()
|
||||
|
||||
def _load_config(self):
|
||||
"""Charge la configuration depuis les variables d'environnement."""
|
||||
self.log_dir = Path(os.getenv("AUDIT_LOG_DIR", "logs/audit"))
|
||||
self.log_file = self.log_dir / "audit.jsonl"
|
||||
self.max_file_size = int(os.getenv("AUDIT_LOG_MAX_SIZE", "10485760")) # 10MB
|
||||
self.max_files = int(os.getenv("AUDIT_LOG_MAX_FILES", "10"))
|
||||
self.hash_sensitive_data = os.getenv("AUDIT_HASH_SENSITIVE", "true").lower() == "true"
|
||||
|
||||
# Créer le répertoire de logs
|
||||
self.log_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
|
||||
logger.info(f"AuditLogger initialized: {self.log_file}")
|
||||
|
||||
def _setup_logging(self):
|
||||
"""Configure le logger Python pour l'audit."""
|
||||
self.audit_logger = logging.getLogger("audit")
|
||||
self.audit_logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
|
||||
|
||||
# Éviter la duplication si déjà configuré
|
||||
if not self.audit_logger.handlers:
|
||||
handler = logging.FileHandler(self.log_file, encoding='utf-8')
|
||||
handler.setLevel(logging.INFO)
|
||||
|
||||
# Format simple car on écrit du JSON
|
||||
formatter = logging.Formatter('%(message)s')
|
||||
handler.setFormatter(formatter)
|
||||
|
||||
self.audit_logger.addHandler(handler)
|
||||
self.audit_logger.propagate = False
|
||||
|
||||
def _hash_sensitive_value(self, value: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Hash une valeur sensible pour le logging."""
|
||||
if not self.hash_sensitive_data:
|
||||
return value
|
||||
|
||||
return hashlib.sha256(value.encode()).hexdigest()[:16]
|
||||
|
||||
def _rotate_logs_if_needed(self):
|
||||
"""Effectue la rotation des logs si nécessaire."""
|
||||
if not self.log_file.exists():
|
||||
return
|
||||
|
||||
if self.log_file.stat().st_size > self.max_file_size:
|
||||
# Rotation des fichiers existants
|
||||
for i in range(self.max_files - 1, 0, -1):
|
||||
old_file = self.log_dir / f"audit.jsonl.{i}"
|
||||
new_file = self.log_dir / f"audit.jsonl.{i + 1}"
|
||||
|
||||
if old_file.exists():
|
||||
if new_file.exists():
|
||||
new_file.unlink()
|
||||
old_file.rename(new_file)
|
||||
|
||||
# Renommer le fichier actuel
|
||||
rotated_file = self.log_dir / "audit.jsonl.1"
|
||||
if rotated_file.exists():
|
||||
rotated_file.unlink()
|
||||
self.log_file.rename(rotated_file)
|
||||
|
||||
# Reconfigurer le handler
|
||||
for handler in self.audit_logger.handlers:
|
||||
handler.close()
|
||||
self.audit_logger.handlers.clear()
|
||||
self._setup_logging()
|
||||
|
||||
logger.info("Audit log rotated")
|
||||
|
||||
def log_event(self, event: AuditEvent):
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Enregistre un événement d'audit.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
event: Événement à enregistrer
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not self._safety.is_feature_enabled("audit_logging"):
|
||||
return
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
# Rotation si nécessaire
|
||||
self._rotate_logs_if_needed()
|
||||
|
||||
# Préparer les données pour JSON
|
||||
event_dict = asdict(event)
|
||||
event_dict["event_type"] = event.event_type.value
|
||||
|
||||
# Hasher les données sensibles
|
||||
if event.token_hash and self.hash_sensitive_data:
|
||||
event_dict["token_hash"] = self._hash_sensitive_value(event.token_hash)
|
||||
|
||||
if event.ip_address and self.hash_sensitive_data:
|
||||
# Pour les IPs, on peut garder les 3 premiers octets
|
||||
ip_parts = event.ip_address.split(".")
|
||||
if len(ip_parts) == 4:
|
||||
event_dict["ip_address"] = f"{ip_parts[0]}.{ip_parts[1]}.{ip_parts[2]}.xxx"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
event_dict["ip_address"] = self._hash_sensitive_value(event.ip_address)
|
||||
|
||||
# Écrire en JSONL
|
||||
json_line = json.dumps(event_dict, ensure_ascii=False, separators=(',', ':'))
|
||||
self.audit_logger.info(json_line)
|
||||
|
||||
except Exception as e:
|
||||
logger.error(f"Failed to log audit event: {e}")
|
||||
|
||||
def write(self, event_data: Dict[str, Any]):
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Écrit un événement d'audit (compatibilité FastAPI).
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
event_data: Données de l'événement
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
# Convertir les données en AuditEvent
|
||||
event_type_str = event_data.get("event", "system_event")
|
||||
|
||||
# Mapper les types d'événements
|
||||
event_type_map = {
|
||||
"ip_block": AuditEventType.IP_BLOCKED,
|
||||
"auth_fail": AuditEventType.AUTHENTICATION,
|
||||
"killswitch_block": AuditEventType.SECURITY_VIOLATION,
|
||||
"demo_safe_block": AuditEventType.SECURITY_VIOLATION,
|
||||
"rate_limit": AuditEventType.RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED,
|
||||
"request_success": AuditEventType.API_ACCESS,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
event_type = event_type_map.get(event_type_str, AuditEventType.SYSTEM_EVENT)
|
||||
|
||||
event = AuditEvent(
|
||||
event_type=event_type,
|
||||
timestamp=datetime.utcnow().isoformat() + "Z",
|
||||
message=event_data.get("event", "Unknown event"),
|
||||
user_id=event_data.get("user_id"),
|
||||
ip_address=event_data.get("ip"),
|
||||
endpoint=event_data.get("path"),
|
||||
method=event_data.get("method"),
|
||||
token_hash=event_data.get("token_hash"),
|
||||
success=event_type_str == "request_success",
|
||||
metadata=event_data
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
self.log_event(event)
|
||||
|
||||
except Exception as e:
|
||||
logger.error(f"Failed to write audit event: {e}")
|
||||
|
||||
def log_authentication(self, user_id: Optional[str], ip_address: str,
|
||||
success: bool, method: str = "token",
|
||||
error_code: Optional[str] = None, **metadata):
|
||||
"""Log un événement d'authentification."""
|
||||
event = AuditEvent(
|
||||
event_type=AuditEventType.AUTHENTICATION,
|
||||
timestamp=datetime.utcnow().isoformat() + "Z",
|
||||
message=f"Authentication {'successful' if success else 'failed'} for user {user_id or 'anonymous'}",
|
||||
user_id=user_id,
|
||||
ip_address=ip_address,
|
||||
success=success,
|
||||
error_code=error_code,
|
||||
metadata={**metadata, "auth_method": method}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.log_event(event)
|
||||
|
||||
def log_api_access(self, endpoint: str, method: str, ip_address: str,
|
||||
user_id: Optional[str] = None, status_code: int = 200,
|
||||
user_agent: Optional[str] = None, **metadata):
|
||||
"""Log un accès API."""
|
||||
event = AuditEvent(
|
||||
event_type=AuditEventType.API_ACCESS,
|
||||
timestamp=datetime.utcnow().isoformat() + "Z",
|
||||
message=f"{method} {endpoint} - {status_code}",
|
||||
user_id=user_id,
|
||||
ip_address=ip_address,
|
||||
endpoint=endpoint,
|
||||
method=method,
|
||||
user_agent=user_agent,
|
||||
success=200 <= status_code < 400,
|
||||
metadata={**metadata, "status_code": status_code}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.log_event(event)
|
||||
|
||||
def log_security_violation(self, violation_type: str, ip_address: str,
|
||||
details: str, user_id: Optional[str] = None, **metadata):
|
||||
"""Log une violation de sécurité."""
|
||||
event = AuditEvent(
|
||||
event_type=AuditEventType.SECURITY_VIOLATION,
|
||||
timestamp=datetime.utcnow().isoformat() + "Z",
|
||||
message=f"Security violation: {violation_type} - {details}",
|
||||
user_id=user_id,
|
||||
ip_address=ip_address,
|
||||
success=False,
|
||||
metadata={**metadata, "violation_type": violation_type}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.log_event(event)
|
||||
|
||||
def log_rate_limit_exceeded(self, identifier: str, endpoint: Optional[str],
|
||||
ip_address: str, **metadata):
|
||||
"""Log un dépassement de limite de débit."""
|
||||
event = AuditEvent(
|
||||
event_type=AuditEventType.RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED,
|
||||
timestamp=datetime.utcnow().isoformat() + "Z",
|
||||
message=f"Rate limit exceeded for {identifier} on {endpoint or 'default'}",
|
||||
ip_address=ip_address,
|
||||
endpoint=endpoint,
|
||||
success=False,
|
||||
metadata={**metadata, "identifier": identifier}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.log_event(event)
|
||||
|
||||
def log_ip_blocked(self, ip_address: str, reason: str = "Not in allowlist", **metadata):
|
||||
"""Log un blocage d'IP."""
|
||||
event = AuditEvent(
|
||||
event_type=AuditEventType.IP_BLOCKED,
|
||||
timestamp=datetime.utcnow().isoformat() + "Z",
|
||||
message=f"IP {ip_address} blocked: {reason}",
|
||||
ip_address=ip_address,
|
||||
success=False,
|
||||
metadata={**metadata, "block_reason": reason}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.log_event(event)
|
||||
|
||||
def log_token_validation(self, token_hash: str, ip_address: str,
|
||||
success: bool, user_id: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
error_code: Optional[str] = None, **metadata):
|
||||
"""Log une validation de token."""
|
||||
event = AuditEvent(
|
||||
event_type=AuditEventType.TOKEN_VALIDATION,
|
||||
timestamp=datetime.utcnow().isoformat() + "Z",
|
||||
message=f"Token validation {'successful' if success else 'failed'}",
|
||||
user_id=user_id,
|
||||
ip_address=ip_address,
|
||||
token_hash=token_hash,
|
||||
success=success,
|
||||
error_code=error_code,
|
||||
metadata=metadata
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.log_event(event)
|
||||
|
||||
def log_system_event(self, event_name: str, details: str, **metadata):
|
||||
"""Log un événement système."""
|
||||
event = AuditEvent(
|
||||
event_type=AuditEventType.SYSTEM_EVENT,
|
||||
timestamp=datetime.utcnow().isoformat() + "Z",
|
||||
message=f"System event: {event_name} - {details}",
|
||||
metadata={**metadata, "event_name": event_name}
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.log_event(event)
|
||||
|
||||
def log_error(self, error_message: str, error_code: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
ip_address: Optional[str] = None, user_id: Optional[str] = None, **metadata):
|
||||
"""Log une erreur."""
|
||||
event = AuditEvent(
|
||||
event_type=AuditEventType.ERROR,
|
||||
timestamp=datetime.utcnow().isoformat() + "Z",
|
||||
message=f"Error: {error_message}",
|
||||
user_id=user_id,
|
||||
ip_address=ip_address,
|
||||
success=False,
|
||||
error_code=error_code,
|
||||
metadata=metadata
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.log_event(event)
|
||||
|
||||
def get_audit_stats(self) -> Dict:
|
||||
"""Retourne des statistiques sur les logs d'audit."""
|
||||
stats = {
|
||||
"log_file": str(self.log_file),
|
||||
"log_file_exists": self.log_file.exists(),
|
||||
"log_file_size": self.log_file.stat().st_size if self.log_file.exists() else 0,
|
||||
"max_file_size": self.max_file_size,
|
||||
"max_files": self.max_files,
|
||||
"hash_sensitive_data": self.hash_sensitive_data
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Compter les lignes si le fichier existe
|
||||
if self.log_file.exists():
|
||||
try:
|
||||
with open(self.log_file, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f:
|
||||
stats["total_events"] = sum(1 for _ in f)
|
||||
except Exception as e:
|
||||
stats["total_events"] = f"Error counting: {e}"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
stats["total_events"] = 0
|
||||
|
||||
return stats
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Instance globale
|
||||
_audit_logger = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def get_audit_logger() -> AuditLogger:
|
||||
"""Retourne l'instance globale de l'audit logger."""
|
||||
global _audit_logger
|
||||
if _audit_logger is None:
|
||||
_audit_logger = AuditLogger()
|
||||
return _audit_logger
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def log_security_event(event_type: str, message: str, **kwargs):
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Fonction utilitaire pour logger un événement de sécurité.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
event_type: Type d'événement
|
||||
message: Message descriptif
|
||||
**kwargs: Métadonnées additionnelles
|
||||
"""
|
||||
audit_logger = get_audit_logger()
|
||||
|
||||
if event_type == "authentication":
|
||||
audit_logger.log_authentication(**kwargs)
|
||||
elif event_type == "security_violation":
|
||||
audit_logger.log_security_violation(message, **kwargs)
|
||||
elif event_type == "rate_limit":
|
||||
audit_logger.log_rate_limit_exceeded(**kwargs)
|
||||
elif event_type == "ip_blocked":
|
||||
audit_logger.log_ip_blocked(**kwargs)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
audit_logger.log_system_event(event_type, message, **kwargs)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def log_api_access(endpoint: str, method: str, ip_address: str, **kwargs):
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Fonction utilitaire pour logger un accès API.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
endpoint: Endpoint accédé
|
||||
method: Méthode HTTP
|
||||
ip_address: IP du client
|
||||
**kwargs: Métadonnées additionnelles
|
||||
"""
|
||||
get_audit_logger().log_api_access(endpoint, method, ip_address, **kwargs)
|
||||
272
core/security/fastapi_security.py
Normal file
272
core/security/fastapi_security.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
|
||||
"""core/security/fastapi_security.py
|
||||
|
||||
Fiche #23 - Middleware FastAPI (auth + allowlist + rate limit + audit + kill-switch + demo-safe)
|
||||
Fiche #24 - Observabilité (métriques HTTP + request id)
|
||||
|
||||
Intégration:
|
||||
from core.security.fastapi_security import install_security_middlewares
|
||||
install_security_middlewares(app)
|
||||
|
||||
Variables d'environnement:
|
||||
- RPA_AUTH_REQUIRED / RPA_ADMIN_TOKEN / RPA_READ_TOKEN
|
||||
- RPA_IP_ALLOWLIST / RPA_IP_TRUST_PROXY
|
||||
- RPA_RL_RPS / RPA_RL_BURST
|
||||
- RPA_AUDIT_DIR / RPA_AUDIT_ENABLED
|
||||
- DEMO_SAFE / RPA_KILL_SWITCH (ou RPA_KILL_SWITCH_FILE)
|
||||
- RPA_SERVICE_NAME (labels Prometheus)
|
||||
|
||||
Notes:
|
||||
- /metrics, /healthz, / sont publics pour ne pas casser systemd/Prometheus.
|
||||
- Les métriques sont enregistrées aussi pour les requêtes bloquées (401/403/423/429)
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import time
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
from typing import Callable
|
||||
|
||||
from fastapi import Request
|
||||
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
|
||||
|
||||
from .api_tokens import (
|
||||
TokenRole,
|
||||
auth_required,
|
||||
can_read,
|
||||
can_write,
|
||||
classify_request_simple as classify_request,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from .ip_allowlist import IPAllowlist
|
||||
from .rate_limiter import RateLimiter
|
||||
from .audit_log import AuditLogger
|
||||
from core.system.safety_switch import demo_safe_enabled, kill_switch_enabled
|
||||
|
||||
# Fiche #24 - métriques HTTP
|
||||
from core.monitoring.http_server_metrics import (
|
||||
record_http_request,
|
||||
in_flight_inc,
|
||||
in_flight_dec,
|
||||
record_security_block,
|
||||
safe_template,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
DEFAULT_PUBLIC_PATHS = {
|
||||
"/healthz",
|
||||
"/metrics",
|
||||
"/",
|
||||
"/docs",
|
||||
"/redoc",
|
||||
"/openapi.json",
|
||||
"/api/traces/debug-auth", # Debug endpoint
|
||||
"/api/traces/debug-env", # Debug endpoint
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _client_ip_from_request(request: Request, trust_proxy: bool) -> str:
|
||||
"""Extrait l'IP client en tenant compte des proxies."""
|
||||
if trust_proxy:
|
||||
forwarded = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for")
|
||||
if forwarded:
|
||||
return forwarded.split(",")[0].strip()
|
||||
real_ip = request.headers.get("x-real-ip")
|
||||
if real_ip:
|
||||
return real_ip.strip()
|
||||
return request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _is_public(request: Request) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Vérifie si l'endpoint est public (pas d'auth/RL)."""
|
||||
path = request.url.path
|
||||
if path in DEFAULT_PUBLIC_PATHS:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
# Exact match uniquement pour éviter les bypasses
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _route_template(request: Request) -> str:
|
||||
route = request.scope.get("route")
|
||||
template = getattr(route, "path", None)
|
||||
return safe_template(template, request.url.path)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _ensure_request_id(request: Request) -> str:
|
||||
# Si un reverse proxy injecte déjà un ID, on le conserve.
|
||||
rid = request.headers.get("x-request-id")
|
||||
if rid:
|
||||
return rid.strip()
|
||||
return uuid.uuid4().hex
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def install_security_middlewares(app) -> None:
|
||||
"""Installe le middleware de sécurité sur une app FastAPI."""
|
||||
allowlist = IPAllowlist.from_env()
|
||||
limiter = RateLimiter.from_env()
|
||||
audit = AuditLogger.from_env()
|
||||
|
||||
service_name = os.getenv("RPA_SERVICE_NAME", "rpa-vision-v3-api")
|
||||
|
||||
@app.middleware("http")
|
||||
async def _security_middleware(request: Request, call_next: Callable):
|
||||
path = request.url.path
|
||||
method = request.method.upper()
|
||||
path_tpl = _route_template(request)
|
||||
|
||||
request_id = _ensure_request_id(request)
|
||||
# exposé aux handlers applicatifs si besoin
|
||||
request.state.request_id = request_id
|
||||
|
||||
t0 = time.monotonic()
|
||||
in_flight_inc(service_name)
|
||||
|
||||
def _finalize(resp: JSONResponse) -> JSONResponse:
|
||||
# attache toujours le request id
|
||||
try:
|
||||
resp.headers["X-Request-Id"] = request_id
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
duration = time.monotonic() - t0
|
||||
status = getattr(resp, "status_code", 0) or 0
|
||||
record_http_request(service_name, method, path_tpl, status, duration)
|
||||
in_flight_dec(service_name)
|
||||
return resp
|
||||
|
||||
# --- IP allowlist (early) ---
|
||||
client_ip = _client_ip_from_request(request, allowlist.trust_proxy)
|
||||
if allowlist.enabled and not allowlist.is_allowed(client_ip):
|
||||
audit.write({
|
||||
"event": "ip_block",
|
||||
"ip": client_ip,
|
||||
"method": method,
|
||||
"path": path,
|
||||
"request_id": request_id,
|
||||
})
|
||||
record_security_block(service_name, "ip_block")
|
||||
return _finalize(JSONResponse(status_code=403, content={"error": "forbidden"}))
|
||||
|
||||
# Public endpoints (health/metrics) : pas d'auth, pas de RL (pour ne pas casser systemd)
|
||||
if _is_public(request):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
response = await call_next(request)
|
||||
response.headers["X-Request-Id"] = request_id
|
||||
return _finalize(response)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# call_next a pu lever: on compte 500
|
||||
record_http_request(service_name, method, path_tpl, 500, time.monotonic() - t0)
|
||||
in_flight_dec(service_name)
|
||||
raise
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Auth ---
|
||||
ctx, source = classify_request(
|
||||
headers=dict(request.headers),
|
||||
cookies=dict(request.cookies),
|
||||
query_params=dict(request.query_params),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if auth_required():
|
||||
if ctx.role == TokenRole.ANON:
|
||||
audit.write({
|
||||
"event": "auth_fail",
|
||||
"ip": client_ip,
|
||||
"method": method,
|
||||
"path": path,
|
||||
"source": source,
|
||||
"token_present": ctx.token_present,
|
||||
"request_id": request_id,
|
||||
})
|
||||
record_security_block(service_name, "auth_fail")
|
||||
return _finalize(JSONResponse(status_code=401, content={"error": "unauthorized"}))
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Kill-switch / DEMO_SAFE ---
|
||||
if kill_switch_enabled():
|
||||
# Bloque tout sauf admin/security (permet de désactiver)
|
||||
if not path.startswith("/admin/security"):
|
||||
audit.write({
|
||||
"event": "killswitch_block",
|
||||
"ip": client_ip,
|
||||
"method": method,
|
||||
"path": path,
|
||||
"role": ctx.role,
|
||||
"request_id": request_id,
|
||||
})
|
||||
record_security_block(service_name, "killswitch")
|
||||
return _finalize(JSONResponse(status_code=423, content={"error": "killswitch_enabled"}))
|
||||
|
||||
if demo_safe_enabled():
|
||||
# En mode démo : pas d'écriture, et on bloque explicitement l'admin.
|
||||
if path.startswith("/admin/"):
|
||||
# Exception: autorise GET /admin/security/status
|
||||
if not (path == "/admin/security/status" and method == "GET"):
|
||||
audit.write({
|
||||
"event": "demo_safe_block",
|
||||
"ip": client_ip,
|
||||
"method": method,
|
||||
"path": path,
|
||||
"role": ctx.role,
|
||||
"request_id": request_id,
|
||||
})
|
||||
record_security_block(service_name, "demo_safe")
|
||||
return _finalize(JSONResponse(status_code=423, content={"error": "demo_safe"}))
|
||||
|
||||
if not _is_read_only_method(method):
|
||||
audit.write({
|
||||
"event": "demo_safe_block",
|
||||
"ip": client_ip,
|
||||
"method": method,
|
||||
"path": path,
|
||||
"role": ctx.role,
|
||||
"request_id": request_id,
|
||||
})
|
||||
record_security_block(service_name, "demo_safe")
|
||||
return _finalize(JSONResponse(status_code=423, content={"error": "demo_safe"}))
|
||||
|
||||
# --- RBAC simple ---
|
||||
if _is_read_only_method(method):
|
||||
if auth_required() and not can_read(ctx.role):
|
||||
record_security_block(service_name, "forbidden_read")
|
||||
return _finalize(JSONResponse(status_code=403, content={"error": "forbidden"}))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
if auth_required() and not can_write(ctx.role):
|
||||
record_security_block(service_name, "forbidden_write")
|
||||
return _finalize(JSONResponse(status_code=403, content={"error": "forbidden"}))
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Rate limit ---
|
||||
# Key = token (si valide) sinon IP
|
||||
rl_key = ctx.token_hash if ctx.token_hash else client_ip
|
||||
allowed, retry_after = limiter.check(rl_key)
|
||||
if not allowed:
|
||||
audit.write({
|
||||
"event": "rate_limit",
|
||||
"ip": client_ip,
|
||||
"method": method,
|
||||
"path": path,
|
||||
"role": ctx.role,
|
||||
"retry_after_s": retry_after,
|
||||
"request_id": request_id,
|
||||
})
|
||||
record_security_block(service_name, "rate_limit")
|
||||
resp = JSONResponse(status_code=429, content={"error": "rate_limited"})
|
||||
resp.headers["Retry-After"] = str(int(max(1, retry_after)))
|
||||
return _finalize(resp)
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Exécution ---
|
||||
response = await call_next(request)
|
||||
|
||||
# Audit des succès
|
||||
audit.write({
|
||||
"event": "request_success",
|
||||
"ip": client_ip,
|
||||
"method": method,
|
||||
"path": path,
|
||||
"status": getattr(response, "status_code", None),
|
||||
"request_id": request_id,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
# Note: finalize ajoute header + enregistre métriques
|
||||
response.headers["X-Request-Id"] = request_id
|
||||
return _finalize(response)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _is_read_only_method(method: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Vérifie si la méthode HTTP est en lecture seule."""
|
||||
return method.upper() in {"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"}
|
||||
257
core/security/flask_security.py
Normal file
257
core/security/flask_security.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
|
||||
"""core/security/flask_security.py
|
||||
|
||||
Fiche #23 - Sécurité pour applis Flask/Flask-SocketIO
|
||||
Fiche #24 - Observabilité (métriques HTTP + request id)
|
||||
|
||||
But:
|
||||
- Protéger /api/* via tokens (admin vs read-only)
|
||||
- IP allowlist
|
||||
- Rate limit
|
||||
- Audit log
|
||||
- Kill-switch + DEMO_SAFE
|
||||
- Enregistrer des métriques Prometheus (y compris sur blocage)
|
||||
- Ajouter un header X-Request-Id
|
||||
|
||||
UX:
|
||||
- Permet de poser le token en cookie via '?token=...' sur la page d'accueil.
|
||||
- Laisse l'HTML et les assets accessibles (mais l'API nécessite token).
|
||||
|
||||
Env:
|
||||
- mêmes variables que FastAPI (voir core/security/fastapi_security.py)
|
||||
- RPA_SERVICE_NAME (labels Prometheus)
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import time
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
from typing import Optional
|
||||
|
||||
from flask import request, jsonify, redirect, make_response, g
|
||||
|
||||
from .api_tokens import (
|
||||
TokenRole,
|
||||
auth_required,
|
||||
can_read,
|
||||
can_write,
|
||||
classify_request_simple as classify_request,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from .ip_allowlist import IPAllowlist
|
||||
from .rate_limiter import RateLimiter
|
||||
from .audit_log import AuditLogger
|
||||
from core.system.safety_switch import demo_safe_enabled, kill_switch_enabled
|
||||
|
||||
# Fiche #24 metrics
|
||||
from core.monitoring.http_server_metrics import (
|
||||
record_http_request,
|
||||
in_flight_inc,
|
||||
in_flight_dec,
|
||||
record_security_block,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
DEFAULT_PUBLIC_PREFIXES = (
|
||||
"/static/",
|
||||
"/assets/",
|
||||
"/favicon.ico",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
DEFAULT_PUBLIC_PATHS = {
|
||||
"/",
|
||||
"/health",
|
||||
"/healthz",
|
||||
"/metrics",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _client_ip(trust_proxy: bool) -> str:
|
||||
"""Extrait l'IP client en tenant compte des proxies."""
|
||||
if trust_proxy:
|
||||
forwarded = request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-For")
|
||||
if forwarded:
|
||||
return forwarded.split(",")[0].strip()
|
||||
real_ip = request.headers.get("X-Real-IP")
|
||||
if real_ip:
|
||||
return real_ip.strip()
|
||||
return request.remote_addr or "unknown"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _is_read_only_method(method: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Vérifie si la méthode HTTP est en lecture seule."""
|
||||
return method.upper() in {"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _is_public(path: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Vérifie si le path est public (pas d'auth/RL)."""
|
||||
if path in DEFAULT_PUBLIC_PATHS:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return any(path.startswith(p) for p in DEFAULT_PUBLIC_PREFIXES)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def install_flask_security(app, protect_api_prefix: str = "/api/", service_name: Optional[str] = None) -> None:
|
||||
"""Installe la sécurité sur une app Flask.
|
||||
- protège seulement les routes commençant par protect_api_prefix (par défaut /api/)
|
||||
- laisse l'HTML et les assets accessibles (mais l'API nécessite token)
|
||||
- ajoute X-Request-Id et métriques HTTP
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
app: Flask app
|
||||
protect_api_prefix: préfixe API à protéger
|
||||
service_name: label Prometheus (par défaut: RPA_SERVICE_NAME ou 'rpa-vision-v3-dashboard')
|
||||
"""
|
||||
allowlist = IPAllowlist.from_env()
|
||||
limiter = RateLimiter.from_env()
|
||||
audit = AuditLogger.from_env()
|
||||
|
||||
svc = service_name or os.getenv("RPA_SERVICE_NAME") or "rpa-vision-v3-dashboard"
|
||||
|
||||
@app.before_request
|
||||
def _observability_before_request():
|
||||
# request id (propagation si déjà présent)
|
||||
rid = request.headers.get("X-Request-Id") or str(uuid.uuid4())
|
||||
g.rpa_request_id = rid
|
||||
g.rpa_start_time = time.monotonic()
|
||||
in_flight_inc(svc)
|
||||
|
||||
@app.after_request
|
||||
def _observability_after_request(response):
|
||||
# X-Request-Id
|
||||
rid = getattr(g, "rpa_request_id", None)
|
||||
if rid:
|
||||
response.headers["X-Request-Id"] = rid
|
||||
|
||||
# Metrics (même pour réponses générées dans before_request)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
start = getattr(g, "rpa_start_time", None)
|
||||
duration = (time.monotonic() - start) if start else 0.0
|
||||
# template: url_rule.rule si dispo, sinon path raw
|
||||
path_template = None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if request.url_rule is not None:
|
||||
path_template = request.url_rule.rule
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
path_template = None
|
||||
|
||||
record_http_request(
|
||||
service=svc,
|
||||
method=request.method,
|
||||
path_template=path_template or (request.path or "/"),
|
||||
status_code=getattr(response, "status_code", 200),
|
||||
duration_seconds=duration,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# best-effort
|
||||
pass
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
in_flight_dec(svc)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
return response
|
||||
|
||||
@app.before_request
|
||||
def _security_before_request():
|
||||
"""Middleware de sécurité principal."""
|
||||
path = request.path
|
||||
method = request.method
|
||||
|
||||
# Public (assets, health, metrics) : pas de sécurité
|
||||
if _is_public(path):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
# API seulement (par défaut /api/*)
|
||||
if not path.startswith(protect_api_prefix):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
# IP allowlist (early)
|
||||
client_ip = _client_ip(allowlist.trust_proxy)
|
||||
if allowlist.enabled and not allowlist.is_allowed(client_ip):
|
||||
record_security_block(svc, "ip_block")
|
||||
audit.write({"event": "ip_block", "ip": client_ip, "method": method, "path": path})
|
||||
return jsonify({"error": "forbidden"}), 403
|
||||
|
||||
# Auth
|
||||
ctx, source = classify_request(
|
||||
headers=dict(request.headers),
|
||||
cookies=dict(request.cookies),
|
||||
query_params=dict(request.args),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if auth_required():
|
||||
if ctx.role == TokenRole.ANON:
|
||||
record_security_block(svc, "auth_fail")
|
||||
audit.write({
|
||||
"event": "auth_fail",
|
||||
"ip": client_ip,
|
||||
"method": method,
|
||||
"path": path,
|
||||
"source": source,
|
||||
"token_present": ctx.token_present,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return jsonify({"error": "unauthorized"}), 401
|
||||
|
||||
# Kill-switch
|
||||
if kill_switch_enabled():
|
||||
# Bloque tout sauf admin/security (permet de désactiver) et health.
|
||||
if not path.startswith("/admin/security"):
|
||||
record_security_block(svc, "killswitch")
|
||||
audit.write({"event": "killswitch_block", "ip": client_ip, "method": method, "path": path, "role": ctx.role})
|
||||
return jsonify({"error": "killswitch_enabled"}), 423
|
||||
|
||||
if demo_safe_enabled():
|
||||
# Exception: autorise GET /admin/security/status
|
||||
if path.startswith("/admin/"):
|
||||
if not (path == "/admin/security/status" and _is_read_only_method(method)):
|
||||
record_security_block(svc, "demo_safe")
|
||||
audit.write({"event": "demo_safe_block", "ip": client_ip, "method": method, "path": path, "role": ctx.role})
|
||||
return jsonify({"error": "demo_safe"}), 423
|
||||
|
||||
if not _is_read_only_method(method):
|
||||
record_security_block(svc, "demo_safe")
|
||||
audit.write({"event": "demo_safe_block", "ip": client_ip, "method": method, "path": path, "role": ctx.role})
|
||||
return jsonify({"error": "demo_safe"}), 423
|
||||
|
||||
# RBAC
|
||||
if _is_read_only_method(method):
|
||||
if auth_required() and not can_read(ctx.role):
|
||||
record_security_block(svc, "forbidden")
|
||||
return jsonify({"error": "forbidden"}), 403
|
||||
else:
|
||||
if auth_required() and not can_write(ctx.role):
|
||||
record_security_block(svc, "forbidden")
|
||||
return jsonify({"error": "forbidden"}), 403
|
||||
|
||||
# RL
|
||||
rl_key = ctx.token_hash if ctx.token_hash else client_ip
|
||||
allowed, retry_after = limiter.check(rl_key)
|
||||
if not allowed:
|
||||
record_security_block(svc, "rate_limit")
|
||||
audit.write({"event": "rate_limit", "ip": client_ip, "method": method, "path": path, "role": ctx.role, "retry_after_s": retry_after})
|
||||
resp = jsonify({"error": "rate_limited"})
|
||||
resp.status_code = 429
|
||||
resp.headers["Retry-After"] = str(int(max(1, retry_after)))
|
||||
return resp
|
||||
|
||||
# Succès : on laisse passer
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def handle_token_in_url(app) -> None:
|
||||
"""Permet de passer le token via ?token=... et le stocker en cookie."""
|
||||
|
||||
@app.route("/")
|
||||
def _index_with_token():
|
||||
token = request.args.get("token")
|
||||
if token:
|
||||
# Stocker en cookie et rediriger sans le token dans l'URL
|
||||
resp = make_response(redirect("/"))
|
||||
resp.set_cookie("rpa_token", token, httponly=True, secure=False, samesite="Lax")
|
||||
return resp
|
||||
|
||||
# Page normale
|
||||
return """
|
||||
<h1>RPA Vision V3 Dashboard</h1>
|
||||
<p><a href="/admin/">Admin Panel</a></p>
|
||||
<p><a href="/metrics">Metrics</a></p>
|
||||
"""
|
||||
327
core/security/input_validator.py
Normal file
327
core/security/input_validator.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Input Validation System
|
||||
|
||||
Système de validation des entrées utilisateur pour la sécurité.
|
||||
Exigence 7.2: Protection contre les injections SQL/NoSQL
|
||||
Exigence 7.3: Validation des chemins de fichiers
|
||||
Exigence 7.4: Sanitization des données loggées
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import re
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
import html
|
||||
import json
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Union, Set
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass
|
||||
|
||||
from .security_config import get_security_config, hash_sensitive_value
|
||||
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class ValidationResult:
|
||||
"""Résultat de validation d'une entrée."""
|
||||
|
||||
is_valid: bool
|
||||
sanitized_value: Any
|
||||
errors: List[str]
|
||||
warnings: List[str]
|
||||
|
||||
def __post_init__(self):
|
||||
if self.errors is None:
|
||||
self.errors = []
|
||||
if self.warnings is None:
|
||||
self.warnings = []
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class InputValidationError(Exception):
|
||||
"""Erreur de validation d'entrée."""
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class SecurityViolationError(InputValidationError):
|
||||
"""Violation de sécurité détectée."""
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class InputValidator:
|
||||
"""Validateur d'entrées utilisateur."""
|
||||
|
||||
# Patterns dangereux pour injection SQL
|
||||
SQL_INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
|
||||
r"(\b(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|CREATE|ALTER|EXEC|EXECUTE)\b)",
|
||||
r"(\b(UNION|OR|AND)\s+\d+\s*=\s*\d+)",
|
||||
r"(--|#|/\*|\*/)",
|
||||
r"(\b(SCRIPT|JAVASCRIPT|VBSCRIPT|ONLOAD|ONERROR)\b)",
|
||||
r"([\'\";])",
|
||||
r"(\bxp_cmdshell\b)",
|
||||
r"(\bsp_executesql\b)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
# Patterns dangereux pour injection NoSQL
|
||||
NOSQL_INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
|
||||
r"(\$where|\$regex|\$ne|\$gt|\$lt|\$in|\$nin)",
|
||||
r"(function\s*\(|\beval\b|\bsetTimeout\b)",
|
||||
r"(\{\s*\$.*\})",
|
||||
r"(this\.|db\.)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, strict_mode: Optional[bool] = None):
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Initialise le validateur.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
strict_mode: Mode strict (None = auto selon config)
|
||||
"""
|
||||
config = get_security_config()
|
||||
self.strict_mode = strict_mode if strict_mode is not None else config.strict_input_validation
|
||||
self.log_sensitive = config.log_sensitive_data
|
||||
|
||||
# Compiler les patterns pour performance
|
||||
self._sql_patterns = [re.compile(pattern, re.IGNORECASE) for pattern in self.SQL_INJECTION_PATTERNS]
|
||||
self._nosql_patterns = [re.compile(pattern, re.IGNORECASE) for pattern in self.NOSQL_INJECTION_PATTERNS]
|
||||
|
||||
def validate_string(self, value: str, max_length: int = 1000,
|
||||
allow_html: bool = False, field_name: str = "input") -> ValidationResult:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Valide une chaîne de caractères.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
value: Valeur à valider
|
||||
max_length: Longueur maximale
|
||||
allow_html: Autoriser le HTML
|
||||
field_name: Nom du champ pour les logs
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
Résultat de validation
|
||||
"""
|
||||
errors = []
|
||||
warnings = []
|
||||
sanitized = value
|
||||
|
||||
if not isinstance(value, str):
|
||||
errors.append(f"{field_name} must be a string")
|
||||
return ValidationResult(False, None, errors, warnings)
|
||||
|
||||
# Vérifier la longueur
|
||||
if len(value) > max_length:
|
||||
if self.strict_mode:
|
||||
errors.append(f"{field_name} exceeds maximum length of {max_length}")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
warnings.append(f"{field_name} truncated to {max_length} characters")
|
||||
sanitized = value[:max_length]
|
||||
|
||||
# Vérifier les injections SQL
|
||||
for pattern in self._sql_patterns:
|
||||
if pattern.search(value):
|
||||
if self.strict_mode:
|
||||
errors.append(f"{field_name} contains potential SQL injection pattern")
|
||||
self._log_security_violation("SQL injection attempt", field_name, value)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
warnings.append(f"{field_name} contains suspicious SQL pattern")
|
||||
|
||||
# Vérifier les injections NoSQL
|
||||
for pattern in self._nosql_patterns:
|
||||
if pattern.search(value):
|
||||
if self.strict_mode:
|
||||
errors.append(f"{field_name} contains potential NoSQL injection pattern")
|
||||
self._log_security_violation("NoSQL injection attempt", field_name, value)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
warnings.append(f"{field_name} contains suspicious NoSQL pattern")
|
||||
|
||||
# Sanitizer HTML si nécessaire
|
||||
if not allow_html:
|
||||
sanitized = html.escape(sanitized)
|
||||
|
||||
# Nettoyer les caractères de contrôle
|
||||
sanitized = re.sub(r'[\x00-\x08\x0B\x0C\x0E-\x1F\x7F]', '', sanitized)
|
||||
|
||||
is_valid = len(errors) == 0
|
||||
return ValidationResult(is_valid, sanitized, errors, warnings)
|
||||
|
||||
def sanitize_for_logging(self, data: Any, field_name: str = "data") -> str:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Sanitise des données pour le logging sécurisé.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
data: Données à sanitiser
|
||||
field_name: Nom du champ
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
Données sanitisées pour logging
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not self.log_sensitive:
|
||||
# En mode sécurisé, hasher les données sensibles
|
||||
if isinstance(data, str) and len(data) > 20:
|
||||
return f"{field_name}[hash:{hash_sensitive_value(data)}]"
|
||||
elif isinstance(data, (dict, list)):
|
||||
return f"{field_name}[{type(data).__name__}:size={len(data)}]"
|
||||
|
||||
# Convertir en string et limiter la taille
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if isinstance(data, (dict, list)):
|
||||
data_str = json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=True, separators=(',', ':'))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
data_str = str(data)
|
||||
|
||||
# Limiter la taille pour les logs
|
||||
if len(data_str) > 200:
|
||||
data_str = data_str[:200] + "..."
|
||||
|
||||
# Échapper les caractères dangereux
|
||||
data_str = html.escape(data_str)
|
||||
|
||||
return data_str
|
||||
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return f"{field_name}[unprintable:{type(data).__name__}]"
|
||||
|
||||
def _log_security_violation(self, violation_type: str, field_name: str, value: Any) -> None:
|
||||
"""Log une violation de sécurité."""
|
||||
sanitized_value = self.sanitize_for_logging(value, field_name)
|
||||
logger.warning(
|
||||
f"Security violation detected: {violation_type} in {field_name}. "
|
||||
f"Value: {sanitized_value}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Instance globale du validateur
|
||||
_validator_instance: Optional[InputValidator] = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def get_input_validator() -> InputValidator:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Retourne l'instance globale du validateur.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
Instance du validateur
|
||||
"""
|
||||
global _validator_instance
|
||||
if _validator_instance is None:
|
||||
_validator_instance = InputValidator()
|
||||
return _validator_instance
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def validate_string_input(value: str, max_length: int = 1000,
|
||||
allow_html: bool = False, field_name: str = "input") -> str:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Valide et sanitise une entrée string.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
value: Valeur à valider
|
||||
max_length: Longueur maximale
|
||||
allow_html: Autoriser le HTML
|
||||
field_name: Nom du champ
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
Valeur sanitisée
|
||||
|
||||
Raises:
|
||||
InputValidationError: Si la validation échoue
|
||||
"""
|
||||
validator = get_input_validator()
|
||||
result = validator.validate_string(value, max_length, allow_html, field_name)
|
||||
|
||||
if not result.is_valid:
|
||||
raise InputValidationError(f"Validation failed for {field_name}: {'; '.join(result.errors)}")
|
||||
|
||||
return result.sanitized_value
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def validate_file_path_input(file_path: str, allowed_dirs: Optional[List[str]] = None) -> str:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Valide un chemin de fichier.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
file_path: Chemin à valider
|
||||
allowed_dirs: Répertoires autorisés
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
Chemin validé et normalisé
|
||||
|
||||
Raises:
|
||||
InputValidationError: Si le chemin est dangereux
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not isinstance(file_path, str):
|
||||
raise InputValidationError("File path must be a string")
|
||||
|
||||
# Normaliser le chemin
|
||||
normalized_path = os.path.normpath(file_path)
|
||||
|
||||
# Vérifier les tentatives de path traversal
|
||||
if ".." in normalized_path or normalized_path.startswith("/"):
|
||||
raise SecurityViolationError(f"Path traversal attempt detected: {file_path}")
|
||||
|
||||
# Vérifier les extensions dangereuses
|
||||
dangerous_extensions = {'.exe', '.bat', '.cmd', '.scr', '.vbs', '.js', '.php', '.sh'}
|
||||
file_ext = Path(normalized_path).suffix.lower()
|
||||
if file_ext in dangerous_extensions:
|
||||
raise SecurityViolationError(f"Dangerous file extension: {file_ext}")
|
||||
|
||||
# Vérifier les répertoires autorisés si spécifiés
|
||||
if allowed_dirs:
|
||||
path_obj = Path(normalized_path)
|
||||
if not any(str(path_obj).startswith(allowed_dir) for allowed_dir in allowed_dirs):
|
||||
raise InputValidationError(f"File path not in allowed directories: {normalized_path}")
|
||||
|
||||
return normalized_path
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def validate_json_input(json_data: Union[str, dict], max_size: int = 10000) -> dict:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Valide des données JSON.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
json_data: Données JSON (string ou dict)
|
||||
max_size: Taille maximale en caractères
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
Données JSON validées
|
||||
|
||||
Raises:
|
||||
InputValidationError: Si les données sont invalides
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if isinstance(json_data, str):
|
||||
if len(json_data) > max_size:
|
||||
raise InputValidationError(f"JSON data exceeds maximum size of {max_size}")
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
parsed_data = json.loads(json_data)
|
||||
except json.JSONDecodeError as e:
|
||||
raise InputValidationError(f"Invalid JSON format: {e}")
|
||||
elif isinstance(json_data, dict):
|
||||
# Vérifier la taille sérialisée
|
||||
serialized = json.dumps(json_data)
|
||||
if len(serialized) > max_size:
|
||||
raise InputValidationError(f"JSON data exceeds maximum size of {max_size}")
|
||||
parsed_data = json_data
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise InputValidationError("JSON data must be string or dict")
|
||||
|
||||
# Valider le contenu pour les injections
|
||||
validator = get_input_validator()
|
||||
json_str = json.dumps(parsed_data)
|
||||
result = validator.validate_string(json_str, max_length=max_size, field_name="json_data")
|
||||
|
||||
if not result.is_valid:
|
||||
raise InputValidationError(f"JSON validation failed: {'; '.join(result.errors)}")
|
||||
|
||||
return parsed_data
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def sanitize_for_logging(data: Any, field_name: str = "data") -> str:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Sanitise des données pour le logging.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
data: Données à sanitiser
|
||||
field_name: Nom du champ
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
Données sanitisées
|
||||
"""
|
||||
validator = get_input_validator()
|
||||
return validator.sanitize_for_logging(data, field_name)
|
||||
327
core/security/input_validator_new.py
Normal file
327
core/security/input_validator_new.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
|
||||
e)a, field_namg(datin_loggsanitize_fordator.valieturn r()
|
||||
or_validatet_inputalidator = g""
|
||||
v
|
||||
"iséesnées sanit Don
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
amp
|
||||
chNom du ame: field_ntiser
|
||||
s à saniata: Donnée d
|
||||
|
||||
Args:ging.
|
||||
le loges pours donnéSanitise de """
|
||||
-> str:
|
||||
"data") me: str = nay, field_ta: An(da_loggingize_for sanita
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
defarsed_dat return p
|
||||
")
|
||||
errors)}t.uljoin(res {'; '.ed:ion failalidator(f"JSON vlidationErrise InputVa ralid:
|
||||
is_vat.not resul if
|
||||
")
|
||||
"json_datafield_name=e, th=max_sizr, max_lengring(json_stalidate_stvalidator.vt =
|
||||
resuldata)s(parsed_on.dump = js json_strtor()
|
||||
put_validaet_in gidator =s
|
||||
vales injectionur lontenu poider le c
|
||||
# Valt")
|
||||
dicng orbe strimust N data "JSOionError(putValidat raise In se:
|
||||
|
||||
elson_data_data = jparsed")
|
||||
size}max_ze of { maximum siexceedsN data rror(f"JSOValidationEaise Input r_size:
|
||||
lized) > maxlen(seria if a)
|
||||
s(json_dat json.dumpalized =eri sialisée
|
||||
ére sla taillrifier # Véct):
|
||||
ata, di_de(jsonncsinsta elif i
|
||||
t: {e}") JSON formaidror(f"InvalErdationalise InputV raie:
|
||||
ror as JSONDecodeErt json. excep n_data)
|
||||
loads(jsojson.= d_data parse
|
||||
try:
|
||||
size}")
|
||||
{max_mum size of axiceeds m data exONor(f"JSrrtionEputValidaise In ra
|
||||
max_size:a) >(json_datf len i
|
||||
data, str):json_isinstance( if ""
|
||||
" invalides
|
||||
sont ess donnéSi letionError: InputValida s:
|
||||
Raise
|
||||
|
||||
ON validéess JS Donnéeurns:
|
||||
|
||||
Ret s
|
||||
n caractèremale exille maax_size: Tai mou dict)
|
||||
string nnées JSON (: Do_data json
|
||||
|
||||
Args: .
|
||||
nnées JSONdo Valide des "
|
||||
|
||||
"") -> dict:= 10000x_size: int t], man[str, dicnion_data: Uput(jsoe_json_inalidat
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def ved_pathurn normaliz ret
|
||||
|
||||
")ath}malized_pories: {norwed directllon apath not ior(f"File ionErratlide InputVa rais ):
|
||||
rslowed_di_dir in al for allowedr)d_diallowe.startswith(_obj)str(pathot any( if n)
|
||||
alized_pathPath(normpath_obj = :
|
||||
_dirsif allowed
|
||||
i spécifiésautorisés soires répertrifier lesVé
|
||||
# ")
|
||||
xt}n: {file_extensio engerous filer(f"DaolationErroyVi Securit raisensions:
|
||||
xtegerous_ext in danf file_e()
|
||||
ix.lowerath).suffied_pnormalizxt = Path( file_e p', '.sh'}
|
||||
.ph', ' '.jscr', '.vbs', '.s, '.cmd',xe', '.bat'{'.ensions = ngerous_exte dauses
|
||||
angereons densies exter l Vérifi
|
||||
#_path}")
|
||||
{file detected:attemptl raversa t"Pathrror(fationEyViol Securitise ra"/"):
|
||||
ith(path.startswd_or normalizelized_path in norma ".." ifl
|
||||
rsaraveh tives de patntat les teVérifier # )
|
||||
|
||||
_pathle.normpath(fih = os.pathpatrmalized_ noin
|
||||
ser le chem# Normali
|
||||
ng")
|
||||
t be a strile path mus"Fir(dationErroalise InputV raitr):
|
||||
th, se_pailsinstance(ft i if no
|
||||
"""
|
||||
ngereux dae chemin estError: Si lionnputValidat I
|
||||
aises:
|
||||
R
|
||||
sénormalit min validé e Che
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
|
||||
orisésutres ars: Répertoilowed_di al valider
|
||||
n àhemie_path: C filgs:
|
||||
Ar
|
||||
chier.
|
||||
hemin de fialide un c V"
|
||||
" ":
|
||||
trne) -> s No] =str]List[ional[rs: Optwed_di: str, allole_pathath_input(fifile_plidate_vae
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def ized_valuresult.sanitreturn
|
||||
|
||||
.errors)}").join(resulte}: {'; 'field_named for {dation failf"ValinError(idatio InputValserai is_valid:
|
||||
t.ul not res
|
||||
if_name)
|
||||
_html, fieldength, allow, max_lring(valuealidate_stidator.vval = resultor()
|
||||
idatt_input_valator = ge"
|
||||
valid""ue
|
||||
échotionlidai la vaor: SdationErrnputVali Is:
|
||||
se
|
||||
Rai
|
||||
nitisée sa Valeureturns:
|
||||
R
|
||||
p
|
||||
du chamm d_name: No fiel HTML
|
||||
oriser leow_html: Aut all ximale
|
||||
Longueur mamax_length: r
|
||||
r à valideue: Valeu val Args:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
ée string.e une entranitisalide et s
|
||||
V"""r:
|
||||
t") -> st= "inpue: str e, field_namalsool = Fw_html: b allo
|
||||
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||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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||||
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||||
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||||
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|
||||
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
||||
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||||
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||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
istrs: L erroue: Any
|
||||
ed_val sanitiz: bool
|
||||
lid
|
||||
is_va"""
|
||||
une entrée.dation d' de valitat"Résul""lt:
|
||||
ationResuclass Validaclass
|
||||
dat
|
||||
|
||||
@_)
|
||||
ame_etLogger(__ngging.g
|
||||
logger = lolue
|
||||
ive_vaash_sensitonfig, h_cecurityimport get_srity_config .secu
|
||||
|
||||
from dataclassrtpoimdataclasses
|
||||
from Union, SetOptional,, List, Any, Dict import ng
|
||||
from typirt Pathimpoib thlfrom pajson
|
||||
|
||||
import l htmortlogging
|
||||
impe
|
||||
import port r
|
||||
imrt ospo"
|
||||
|
||||
im"ggées
|
||||
"données loization des 7.4: Sanit
|
||||
Exigence s chiers de fin des chemintioalida3: VExigence 7.
|
||||
SQL/NoSQLonsti injeccontre lesion ectotence 7.2: PrExigé.
|
||||
a sécuritur lteur polisatrées utiion des envalidat
|
||||
Système de m
|
||||
stedation Syut Vali"""
|
||||
Inp
|
||||
372
core/security/ip_allowlist.py
Normal file
372
core/security/ip_allowlist.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,372 @@
|
||||
"""
|
||||
IP Allowlist System
|
||||
|
||||
Système de liste blanche IP avec support CIDR et proxy trust.
|
||||
Fiche #23: API Security & Governance
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import ipaddress
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
from typing import List, Set, Optional, Dict, Union
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass
|
||||
|
||||
from ..system.safety_switch import get_safety_switch
|
||||
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class IPConfig:
|
||||
"""Configuration de la liste blanche IP."""
|
||||
allowed_networks: List[Union[ipaddress.IPv4Network, ipaddress.IPv6Network]]
|
||||
trusted_proxies: List[Union[ipaddress.IPv4Network, ipaddress.IPv6Network]]
|
||||
enable_proxy_headers: bool = True
|
||||
log_blocked_ips: bool = True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class IPValidationError(Exception):
|
||||
"""Erreur de validation IP."""
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class IPAllowlist:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Gestionnaire de liste blanche IP avec support CIDR.
|
||||
|
||||
Fonctionnalités:
|
||||
- Support IPv4 et IPv6
|
||||
- Plages CIDR (ex: 192.168.1.0/24)
|
||||
- Gestion des proxies de confiance
|
||||
- Headers X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self):
|
||||
self._config = self._load_config()
|
||||
self._safety = get_safety_switch()
|
||||
self._blocked_ips_cache: Set[str] = set()
|
||||
# Attributs pour compatibilité avec fastapi_security.py
|
||||
self.enabled = True
|
||||
self.trust_proxy = True
|
||||
|
||||
@classmethod
|
||||
def from_env(cls):
|
||||
"""Crée une instance depuis les variables d'environnement (compatibilité FastAPI)."""
|
||||
instance = cls()
|
||||
# Configurer selon les variables d'environnement
|
||||
instance.enabled = os.getenv("RPA_IP_ALLOWLIST_ENABLED", "true").lower() == "true"
|
||||
instance.trust_proxy = os.getenv("RPA_IP_TRUST_PROXY", "true").lower() == "true"
|
||||
return instance
|
||||
|
||||
def _load_config(self) -> IPConfig:
|
||||
"""Charge la configuration depuis les variables d'environnement."""
|
||||
# Liste blanche IP
|
||||
allowed_networks = []
|
||||
allowed_ips_str = os.getenv("ALLOWED_IPS", "")
|
||||
|
||||
if allowed_ips_str:
|
||||
for ip_str in allowed_ips_str.split(","):
|
||||
ip_str = ip_str.strip()
|
||||
if not ip_str:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
# Essayer de parser comme réseau CIDR
|
||||
if "/" not in ip_str:
|
||||
# IP individuelle, ajouter /32 ou /128
|
||||
ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
|
||||
if isinstance(ip_obj, ipaddress.IPv4Address):
|
||||
network = ipaddress.IPv4Network(f"{ip_str}/32")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
network = ipaddress.IPv6Network(f"{ip_str}/128")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
network = ipaddress.ip_network(ip_str, strict=False)
|
||||
|
||||
allowed_networks.append(network)
|
||||
logger.debug(f"Added allowed network: {network}")
|
||||
|
||||
except ValueError as e:
|
||||
logger.error(f"Invalid IP/CIDR in ALLOWED_IPS: {ip_str} - {e}")
|
||||
|
||||
# Proxies de confiance
|
||||
trusted_proxies = []
|
||||
trusted_proxies_str = os.getenv("TRUSTED_PROXIES", "")
|
||||
|
||||
if trusted_proxies_str:
|
||||
for proxy_str in trusted_proxies_str.split(","):
|
||||
proxy_str = proxy_str.strip()
|
||||
if not proxy_str:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if "/" not in proxy_str:
|
||||
ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(proxy_str)
|
||||
if isinstance(ip_obj, ipaddress.IPv4Address):
|
||||
network = ipaddress.IPv4Network(f"{proxy_str}/32")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
network = ipaddress.IPv6Network(f"{proxy_str}/128")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
network = ipaddress.ip_network(proxy_str, strict=False)
|
||||
|
||||
trusted_proxies.append(network)
|
||||
logger.debug(f"Added trusted proxy: {network}")
|
||||
|
||||
except ValueError as e:
|
||||
logger.error(f"Invalid proxy IP/CIDR in TRUSTED_PROXIES: {proxy_str} - {e}")
|
||||
|
||||
# Configuration par défaut en développement
|
||||
if not allowed_networks and os.getenv("ENVIRONMENT", "development") == "development":
|
||||
# En développement, autoriser localhost par défaut
|
||||
allowed_networks = [
|
||||
ipaddress.IPv4Network("127.0.0.0/8"), # Localhost IPv4
|
||||
ipaddress.IPv4Network("10.0.0.0/8"), # Private networks
|
||||
ipaddress.IPv4Network("172.16.0.0/12"),
|
||||
ipaddress.IPv4Network("192.168.0.0/16"),
|
||||
ipaddress.IPv6Network("::1/128"), # Localhost IPv6
|
||||
]
|
||||
logger.info("Development mode: using default allowed networks")
|
||||
|
||||
config = IPConfig(
|
||||
allowed_networks=allowed_networks,
|
||||
trusted_proxies=trusted_proxies,
|
||||
enable_proxy_headers=os.getenv("ENABLE_PROXY_HEADERS", "true").lower() == "true",
|
||||
log_blocked_ips=os.getenv("LOG_BLOCKED_IPS", "true").lower() == "true"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
logger.info(f"IPAllowlist initialized with {len(config.allowed_networks)} allowed networks, "
|
||||
f"{len(config.trusted_proxies)} trusted proxies")
|
||||
|
||||
return config
|
||||
|
||||
def is_allowed(self, ip_address: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Vérifie si une adresse IP est autorisée (compatibilité FastAPI).
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
ip_address: Adresse IP à vérifier
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
True si l'IP est autorisée
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return self.is_ip_allowed(ip_address)
|
||||
|
||||
def is_ip_allowed(self, ip_address: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Vérifie si une adresse IP est autorisée.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
ip_address: Adresse IP à vérifier
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
True si l'IP est autorisée
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not self._safety.is_feature_enabled("ip_allowlist"):
|
||||
# Si la liste blanche est désactivée, autoriser tout
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
# Si aucune liste blanche configurée, autoriser tout
|
||||
if not self._config.allowed_networks:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_address)
|
||||
|
||||
# Vérifier contre chaque réseau autorisé
|
||||
for network in self._config.allowed_networks:
|
||||
if ip_obj in network:
|
||||
logger.debug(f"IP {ip_address} allowed by network {network}")
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
# IP non autorisée
|
||||
if self._config.log_blocked_ips and ip_address not in self._blocked_ips_cache:
|
||||
logger.warning(f"IP {ip_address} blocked by allowlist")
|
||||
self._blocked_ips_cache.add(ip_address)
|
||||
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
except ValueError as e:
|
||||
logger.error(f"Invalid IP address format: {ip_address} - {e}")
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
def get_client_ip(self, headers: Dict[str, str], remote_addr: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Extrait l'IP réelle du client en tenant compte des proxies.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
headers: Headers HTTP de la requête
|
||||
remote_addr: Adresse IP directe de la connexion
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
Adresse IP réelle du client
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not self._config.enable_proxy_headers:
|
||||
return remote_addr
|
||||
|
||||
# Vérifier si la requête vient d'un proxy de confiance
|
||||
try:
|
||||
remote_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(remote_addr)
|
||||
is_trusted_proxy = False
|
||||
|
||||
for trusted_network in self._config.trusted_proxies:
|
||||
if remote_ip in trusted_network:
|
||||
is_trusted_proxy = True
|
||||
break
|
||||
|
||||
if not is_trusted_proxy:
|
||||
return remote_addr
|
||||
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
return remote_addr
|
||||
|
||||
# Extraire l'IP des headers de proxy
|
||||
# Ordre de priorité: X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For
|
||||
real_ip = headers.get("X-Real-IP")
|
||||
if real_ip:
|
||||
return real_ip.strip()
|
||||
|
||||
forwarded_for = headers.get("X-Forwarded-For")
|
||||
if forwarded_for:
|
||||
# X-Forwarded-For peut contenir plusieurs IPs séparées par des virgules
|
||||
# La première est généralement l'IP originale du client
|
||||
first_ip = forwarded_for.split(",")[0].strip()
|
||||
return first_ip
|
||||
|
||||
return remote_addr
|
||||
|
||||
def validate_request_ip(self, headers: Dict[str, str], remote_addr: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Valide l'IP d'une requête et retourne l'IP réelle.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
headers: Headers HTTP
|
||||
remote_addr: Adresse IP de connexion
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
IP réelle du client
|
||||
|
||||
Raises:
|
||||
IPValidationError: Si l'IP n'est pas autorisée
|
||||
"""
|
||||
client_ip = self.get_client_ip(headers, remote_addr)
|
||||
|
||||
if not self.is_ip_allowed(client_ip):
|
||||
raise IPValidationError(f"IP address {client_ip} is not allowed")
|
||||
|
||||
return client_ip
|
||||
|
||||
def add_allowed_ip(self, ip_or_cidr: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Ajoute une IP ou plage CIDR à la liste blanche (runtime).
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
ip_or_cidr: IP ou CIDR à ajouter
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
True si ajouté avec succès
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if "/" not in ip_or_cidr:
|
||||
ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_or_cidr)
|
||||
if isinstance(ip_obj, ipaddress.IPv4Address):
|
||||
network = ipaddress.IPv4Network(f"{ip_or_cidr}/32")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
network = ipaddress.IPv6Network(f"{ip_or_cidr}/128")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
network = ipaddress.ip_network(ip_or_cidr, strict=False)
|
||||
|
||||
if network not in self._config.allowed_networks:
|
||||
self._config.allowed_networks.append(network)
|
||||
logger.info(f"Added allowed network: {network}")
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
except ValueError as e:
|
||||
logger.error(f"Failed to add IP/CIDR {ip_or_cidr}: {e}")
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
def remove_allowed_ip(self, ip_or_cidr: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Retire une IP ou plage CIDR de la liste blanche.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
ip_or_cidr: IP ou CIDR à retirer
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
True si retiré avec succès
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if "/" not in ip_or_cidr:
|
||||
ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_or_cidr)
|
||||
if isinstance(ip_obj, ipaddress.IPv4Address):
|
||||
network = ipaddress.IPv4Network(f"{ip_or_cidr}/32")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
network = ipaddress.IPv6Network(f"{ip_or_cidr}/128")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
network = ipaddress.ip_network(ip_or_cidr, strict=False)
|
||||
|
||||
if network in self._config.allowed_networks:
|
||||
self._config.allowed_networks.remove(network)
|
||||
logger.info(f"Removed allowed network: {network}")
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
except ValueError as e:
|
||||
logger.error(f"Failed to remove IP/CIDR {ip_or_cidr}: {e}")
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
def get_allowlist_status(self) -> Dict:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Retourne le statut de la liste blanche.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
Statut complet de la configuration
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"enabled": self._safety.is_feature_enabled("ip_allowlist"),
|
||||
"allowed_networks": [str(net) for net in self._config.allowed_networks],
|
||||
"trusted_proxies": [str(proxy) for proxy in self._config.trusted_proxies],
|
||||
"enable_proxy_headers": self._config.enable_proxy_headers,
|
||||
"log_blocked_ips": self._config.log_blocked_ips,
|
||||
"blocked_ips_count": len(self._blocked_ips_cache)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Instance globale
|
||||
_ip_allowlist = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def get_ip_allowlist() -> IPAllowlist:
|
||||
"""Retourne l'instance globale de la liste blanche IP."""
|
||||
global _ip_allowlist
|
||||
if _ip_allowlist is None:
|
||||
_ip_allowlist = IPAllowlist()
|
||||
return _ip_allowlist
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_ip_allowed(ip_address: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Fonction utilitaire pour vérifier une IP.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
ip_address: IP à vérifier
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
True si autorisée
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return get_ip_allowlist().is_ip_allowed(ip_address)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def get_client_ip(headers: Dict[str, str], remote_addr: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Fonction utilitaire pour extraire l'IP client.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
headers: Headers HTTP
|
||||
remote_addr: IP de connexion
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
IP réelle du client
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return get_ip_allowlist().get_client_ip(headers, remote_addr)
|
||||
400
core/security/rate_limiter.py
Normal file
400
core/security/rate_limiter.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,400 @@
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Rate Limiting System
|
||||
|
||||
Système de limitation de débit avec algorithme token bucket.
|
||||
Fiche #23: API Security & Governance
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import time
|
||||
import threading
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
from typing import Dict, Optional, Tuple
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
|
||||
from collections import defaultdict
|
||||
|
||||
from ..system.safety_switch import get_safety_switch
|
||||
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class TokenBucket:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Implémentation d'un token bucket pour rate limiting.
|
||||
|
||||
Algorithme:
|
||||
- Capacité maximale de tokens
|
||||
- Refill rate (tokens par seconde)
|
||||
- Consommation de tokens par requête
|
||||
"""
|
||||
capacity: int
|
||||
refill_rate: float # tokens par seconde
|
||||
tokens: float = field(init=False)
|
||||
last_refill: float = field(init=False)
|
||||
lock: threading.Lock = field(default_factory=threading.Lock, init=False)
|
||||
|
||||
def __post_init__(self):
|
||||
self.tokens = float(self.capacity)
|
||||
self.last_refill = time.time()
|
||||
|
||||
def consume(self, tokens_needed: int = 1) -> bool:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Tente de consommer des tokens.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
tokens_needed: Nombre de tokens nécessaires
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
True si les tokens ont pu être consommés
|
||||
"""
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
now = time.time()
|
||||
|
||||
# Refill des tokens basé sur le temps écoulé
|
||||
time_passed = now - self.last_refill
|
||||
tokens_to_add = time_passed * self.refill_rate
|
||||
|
||||
self.tokens = min(self.capacity, self.tokens + tokens_to_add)
|
||||
self.last_refill = now
|
||||
|
||||
# Vérifier si on a assez de tokens
|
||||
if self.tokens >= tokens_needed:
|
||||
self.tokens -= tokens_needed
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
def get_status(self) -> Dict:
|
||||
"""Retourne le statut actuel du bucket."""
|
||||
with self.lock:
|
||||
now = time.time()
|
||||
time_passed = now - self.last_refill
|
||||
current_tokens = min(self.capacity, self.tokens + (time_passed * self.refill_rate))
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"capacity": self.capacity,
|
||||
"current_tokens": current_tokens,
|
||||
"refill_rate": self.refill_rate,
|
||||
"time_to_refill": max(0, (self.capacity - current_tokens) / self.refill_rate) if self.refill_rate > 0 else 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class RateLimitConfig:
|
||||
"""Configuration pour un endpoint ou utilisateur."""
|
||||
requests_per_minute: int = 60
|
||||
burst_capacity: int = 10
|
||||
tokens_per_request: int = 1
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class RateLimitExceeded(Exception):
|
||||
"""Exception levée quand la limite de débit est dépassée."""
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, message: str, retry_after: float = 0):
|
||||
super().__init__(message)
|
||||
self.retry_after = retry_after
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class RateLimiter:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Gestionnaire de limitation de débit avec token buckets.
|
||||
|
||||
Fonctionnalités:
|
||||
- Limitation par IP, utilisateur, endpoint
|
||||
- Configuration flexible par règle
|
||||
- Headers HTTP informatifs
|
||||
- Nettoyage automatique des buckets inactifs
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self):
|
||||
self._buckets: Dict[str, TokenBucket] = {}
|
||||
self._configs: Dict[str, RateLimitConfig] = {}
|
||||
self._lock = threading.Lock()
|
||||
self._safety = get_safety_switch()
|
||||
self._load_config()
|
||||
|
||||
# Nettoyage périodique des buckets inactifs
|
||||
self._last_cleanup = time.time()
|
||||
self._cleanup_interval = 300 # 5 minutes
|
||||
|
||||
@classmethod
|
||||
def from_env(cls):
|
||||
"""Crée une instance depuis les variables d'environnement (compatibilité FastAPI)."""
|
||||
return cls()
|
||||
|
||||
def _load_config(self):
|
||||
"""Charge la configuration depuis les variables d'environnement."""
|
||||
# Configuration par défaut
|
||||
default_rpm = int(os.getenv("DEFAULT_RATE_LIMIT_RPM", "60"))
|
||||
default_burst = int(os.getenv("DEFAULT_RATE_LIMIT_BURST", "10"))
|
||||
|
||||
self._default_config = RateLimitConfig(
|
||||
requests_per_minute=default_rpm,
|
||||
burst_capacity=default_burst
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Configurations spécifiques par endpoint
|
||||
# Format: RATE_LIMIT_<ENDPOINT>=rpm:burst
|
||||
for key, value in os.environ.items():
|
||||
if key.startswith("RATE_LIMIT_") and key != "RATE_LIMIT_RPM" and key != "RATE_LIMIT_BURST":
|
||||
endpoint = key[11:].lower() # Enlever "RATE_LIMIT_"
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if ":" in value:
|
||||
rpm_str, burst_str = value.split(":", 1)
|
||||
rpm = int(rpm_str)
|
||||
burst = int(burst_str)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
rpm = int(value)
|
||||
burst = default_burst
|
||||
|
||||
self._configs[endpoint] = RateLimitConfig(
|
||||
requests_per_minute=rpm,
|
||||
burst_capacity=burst
|
||||
)
|
||||
logger.debug(f"Rate limit config for {endpoint}: {rpm} RPM, {burst} burst")
|
||||
|
||||
except ValueError as e:
|
||||
logger.error(f"Invalid rate limit config for {key}: {value} - {e}")
|
||||
|
||||
logger.info(f"RateLimiter initialized with default {default_rpm} RPM, {default_burst} burst")
|
||||
|
||||
def _get_config(self, endpoint: Optional[str] = None) -> RateLimitConfig:
|
||||
"""Retourne la configuration pour un endpoint."""
|
||||
if endpoint and endpoint.lower() in self._configs:
|
||||
return self._configs[endpoint.lower()]
|
||||
return self._default_config
|
||||
|
||||
def _get_bucket_key(self, identifier: str, endpoint: Optional[str] = None) -> str:
|
||||
"""Génère une clé unique pour le bucket."""
|
||||
if endpoint:
|
||||
return f"{identifier}:{endpoint}"
|
||||
return identifier
|
||||
|
||||
def _get_or_create_bucket(self, key: str, config: RateLimitConfig) -> TokenBucket:
|
||||
"""Récupère ou crée un token bucket."""
|
||||
with self._lock:
|
||||
if key not in self._buckets:
|
||||
# Convertir RPM en tokens par seconde
|
||||
refill_rate = config.requests_per_minute / 60.0
|
||||
|
||||
self._buckets[key] = TokenBucket(
|
||||
capacity=config.burst_capacity,
|
||||
refill_rate=refill_rate
|
||||
)
|
||||
logger.debug(f"Created token bucket for {key}: {config.burst_capacity} capacity, {refill_rate:.2f} refill/s")
|
||||
|
||||
return self._buckets[key]
|
||||
|
||||
def check(self, identifier: str) -> Tuple[bool, float]:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Vérifie la limite de débit (compatibilité FastAPI).
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
identifier: Identifiant unique
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
Tuple (allowed, retry_after_seconds)
|
||||
"""
|
||||
allowed, headers = self.check_rate_limit(identifier)
|
||||
retry_after = float(headers.get("Retry-After", "0"))
|
||||
return allowed, retry_after
|
||||
|
||||
def check_rate_limit(self, identifier: str, endpoint: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
tokens_needed: int = 1) -> Tuple[bool, Dict[str, str]]:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Vérifie la limite de débit pour un identifiant.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
identifier: Identifiant unique (IP, user_id, etc.)
|
||||
endpoint: Endpoint optionnel pour des limites spécifiques
|
||||
tokens_needed: Nombre de tokens nécessaires
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
Tuple (allowed, headers) où headers contient les informations de rate limiting
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not self._safety.is_feature_enabled("rate_limiting"):
|
||||
return True, {}
|
||||
|
||||
# Nettoyage périodique
|
||||
self._cleanup_inactive_buckets()
|
||||
|
||||
config = self._get_config(endpoint)
|
||||
bucket_key = self._get_bucket_key(identifier, endpoint)
|
||||
bucket = self._get_or_create_bucket(bucket_key, config)
|
||||
|
||||
# Tenter de consommer les tokens
|
||||
allowed = bucket.consume(tokens_needed)
|
||||
|
||||
# Générer les headers informatifs
|
||||
status = bucket.get_status()
|
||||
headers = {
|
||||
"X-RateLimit-Limit": str(config.requests_per_minute),
|
||||
"X-RateLimit-Remaining": str(int(status["current_tokens"])),
|
||||
"X-RateLimit-Reset": str(int(time.time() + status["time_to_refill"]))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if not allowed:
|
||||
headers["Retry-After"] = str(int(status["time_to_refill"]) + 1)
|
||||
logger.warning(f"Rate limit exceeded for {identifier} on {endpoint or 'default'}")
|
||||
|
||||
return allowed, headers
|
||||
|
||||
def enforce_rate_limit(self, identifier: str, endpoint: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
tokens_needed: int = 1) -> Dict[str, str]:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Applique la limitation de débit et lève une exception si dépassée.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
identifier: Identifiant unique
|
||||
endpoint: Endpoint optionnel
|
||||
tokens_needed: Nombre de tokens nécessaires
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
Headers de rate limiting
|
||||
|
||||
Raises:
|
||||
RateLimitExceeded: Si la limite est dépassée
|
||||
"""
|
||||
allowed, headers = self.check_rate_limit(identifier, endpoint, tokens_needed)
|
||||
|
||||
if not allowed:
|
||||
retry_after = float(headers.get("Retry-After", "60"))
|
||||
raise RateLimitExceeded(
|
||||
f"Rate limit exceeded for {identifier}. Try again in {retry_after} seconds.",
|
||||
retry_after=retry_after
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return headers
|
||||
|
||||
def _cleanup_inactive_buckets(self):
|
||||
"""Nettoie les buckets inactifs pour économiser la mémoire."""
|
||||
now = time.time()
|
||||
|
||||
if now - self._last_cleanup < self._cleanup_interval:
|
||||
return
|
||||
|
||||
with self._lock:
|
||||
inactive_keys = []
|
||||
cutoff_time = now - 3600 # 1 heure d'inactivité
|
||||
|
||||
for key, bucket in self._buckets.items():
|
||||
if bucket.last_refill < cutoff_time:
|
||||
inactive_keys.append(key)
|
||||
|
||||
for key in inactive_keys:
|
||||
del self._buckets[key]
|
||||
|
||||
if inactive_keys:
|
||||
logger.debug(f"Cleaned up {len(inactive_keys)} inactive rate limit buckets")
|
||||
|
||||
self._last_cleanup = now
|
||||
|
||||
def reset_rate_limit(self, identifier: str, endpoint: Optional[str] = None) -> bool:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Remet à zéro la limite de débit pour un identifiant.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
identifier: Identifiant à remettre à zéro
|
||||
endpoint: Endpoint optionnel
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
True si remis à zéro avec succès
|
||||
"""
|
||||
bucket_key = self._get_bucket_key(identifier, endpoint)
|
||||
|
||||
with self._lock:
|
||||
if bucket_key in self._buckets:
|
||||
del self._buckets[bucket_key]
|
||||
logger.info(f"Reset rate limit for {identifier} on {endpoint or 'default'}")
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
def get_rate_limit_status(self, identifier: str, endpoint: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Retourne le statut de rate limiting pour un identifiant.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
identifier: Identifiant à vérifier
|
||||
endpoint: Endpoint optionnel
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
Statut du rate limiting
|
||||
"""
|
||||
bucket_key = self._get_bucket_key(identifier, endpoint)
|
||||
config = self._get_config(endpoint)
|
||||
|
||||
with self._lock:
|
||||
if bucket_key in self._buckets:
|
||||
bucket_status = self._buckets[bucket_key].get_status()
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"identifier": identifier,
|
||||
"endpoint": endpoint,
|
||||
"config": {
|
||||
"requests_per_minute": config.requests_per_minute,
|
||||
"burst_capacity": config.burst_capacity
|
||||
},
|
||||
"current_status": bucket_status
|
||||
}
|
||||
else:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"identifier": identifier,
|
||||
"endpoint": endpoint,
|
||||
"config": {
|
||||
"requests_per_minute": config.requests_per_minute,
|
||||
"burst_capacity": config.burst_capacity
|
||||
},
|
||||
"current_status": {
|
||||
"capacity": config.burst_capacity,
|
||||
"current_tokens": config.burst_capacity,
|
||||
"refill_rate": config.requests_per_minute / 60.0,
|
||||
"time_to_refill": 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
def get_global_status(self) -> Dict:
|
||||
"""Retourne le statut global du rate limiter."""
|
||||
with self._lock:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"enabled": self._safety.is_feature_enabled("rate_limiting"),
|
||||
"active_buckets": len(self._buckets),
|
||||
"default_config": {
|
||||
"requests_per_minute": self._default_config.requests_per_minute,
|
||||
"burst_capacity": self._default_config.burst_capacity
|
||||
},
|
||||
"endpoint_configs": {
|
||||
endpoint: {
|
||||
"requests_per_minute": config.requests_per_minute,
|
||||
"burst_capacity": config.burst_capacity
|
||||
}
|
||||
for endpoint, config in self._configs.items()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Instance globale
|
||||
_rate_limiter = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def get_rate_limiter() -> RateLimiter:
|
||||
"""Retourne l'instance globale du rate limiter."""
|
||||
global _rate_limiter
|
||||
if _rate_limiter is None:
|
||||
_rate_limiter = RateLimiter()
|
||||
return _rate_limiter
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def check_rate_limit(identifier: str, endpoint: Optional[str] = None) -> Tuple[bool, Dict[str, str]]:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Fonction utilitaire pour vérifier une limite de débit.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
identifier: Identifiant unique
|
||||
endpoint: Endpoint optionnel
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
Tuple (allowed, headers)
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return get_rate_limiter().check_rate_limit(identifier, endpoint)
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user